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CASENOTES
The Supreme Court and Tison v. Arizona: A Capital Example of Judicial Unsoundness
— Perhaps because of the finality of death as a punishment for a criminal offense,' the
United States Supreme Court has entertained numerous constitutional challenges to
capital punishment on the theory that it violates the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.2 A pattern has emerged in the over one hundred
years in which the Court has been hearing such cases. Whereas early cases concerned
the mode of execution,' more recent Supreme Court decisions focus on the death
penalty's implementation. 4 Under an approach that focuses on its implementation, death
is a constitutionally permissible sanction, 5 but certain limitations must exist to ensure
that its administration comports with the eighth amendment. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has required that the sentencer impose the death penalty in a nonarbitrary
fashion,6 that the death penalty be proportionate to the crime for which it is sanctioned,'
and that the sentencer be given some guidelines in deciding whether to employ it. 5
Most recently, the Supreme Court used the doctrine of felony murder, which pro-
vides that a person committing a felony where another is killed may be charged with
that murder, to place an additional constraint on the administration of the death penalty.
In 1982, the Supreme Court in Enmund v. Florida' held that the eighth amendment
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("imposition of death by public authority is so
profoundly different from all other penalties"); Seritt v. Alabama, 731 F.2d 728, 732 (11th Cir,
1984) ("death penalty differs from all other forms of criminal punishment").
These challenges have ranged from the style of execution, see generally Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130 (1878), to the unconstitutionality of the death penalty itself. See generally Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5 In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the Court concluded that a public shooting did not
violate the eighth amendment. Id. at 135, 137. In 1890, the Court determined that the Constitution
permitted death by electrocution. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 449 (1890).
4 See Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 700 (1986) (state court responsible for making proper
finding before defendant may be executed); Enmund v, Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (Consti-
tution requires that defendant kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill before being given death
sentence); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982) (sentencer may not refuse to consider
any relevant mitigating factor); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (state must define
capital crimes so as to obviate standardless sentencing); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)
(sentencer must not exclude from consideration any aspect of defendant's character or record as a
mitigating factor); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (death must not be grossly dispro-
portionate to the severity of the crime); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
(mandatory death sentence unconstitutional); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98 (jury discretion to be
tempered by clear and objective standards) (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d
612, 615 (1974)); Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (death cannot be imposed in a
wanton or freakish fashion).
5 See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331 (1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285; Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. at
187.
"See Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
7 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187; Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228,
237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947).
" See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303. Commingled with this idea that the jury must be given some
guidance — a decision that arose because of states having mandatory death sentences — is the
notion that the eighth and fourteenth amendments require the states to consider any mitigating
factor in the sentencing procedure. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
9 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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precluded executing those who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill." Thus,
although the nontriggerperson" could still be convicted of murder under the felony
murder rule, a sentencer could not impose the death penalty on the nontriggerperson
absent a finding that he or she intended to kill."
Enmund caused many of those placed on death row before 1982 to challenge their
sentences. In several of those cases, the reviewing court found present the necessary
requirement that the defendant actually killed or intended to kill and therefore affirmed
the sentences." Some courts, however, vacated the capital sentences because the facts of
the case did not satisfy Enmund." In the 1987 case of non v. Arizona, 15 the Supreme
Court, hearing a challenge to the Arizona Supreme Court's application of Enmund, 16
announced a new standard. Rather than restrict capital punishment to those who killed,
attempted to kill, or intended to kill, the Tison Court held that where a defendant
substantially participated in a felony where another is murdered, and showed a reckless
indifference to human life, a sentencer may constitutionally impose the death penalty.' 7
In Tison, Gary Tison, while serving time in prison, killed a guard during an at-
tempted escape. He received a sentence of life imprisonment." Gary's wife, their three
sons Ricky, Raymond, and Donald, and other relatives formulated plans for helping
Gary Tison escape again.' 9 On July 30, 1978, the three Tison brothers entered the
10 Id. at 797.
11 The Enmund Court used the term "nontriggerperson" to refer to the felon who does not
commit the actual killing.
12 Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689; 697 (1986).
" See, e.g., Skillern v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant agreed in advance
to rob and kill victim), rehk denied, 469 U.S. 1067 (1984); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 37, 734
P.2d 563, 579 (1987) (defendant participated in killing and intended to kill, thereby satisfying
Enmund); Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 84, 656 S.W.2d 684, 687 (1983) (likelihood of homicide
brings case within Enmund exception), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984).
14 See, e.g., Clark v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 694 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1982) (judgment reversed
because jury did not find defendant had mind to kill), reh'g denied, 697 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1983);
State v. Emery, 141 Ariz. 549, 553, 688 P.2d 175, 179 (1984) (death sentence reduced to life
imprisonment because no evidence supporting claim that defendant killed, attempted to kill, or
intended to kill); People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 557, 684 P.2d 826, 836, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 275
(1984) (case remanded because aiding robbery and knowing companion is armed is insufficient to
demonstrate that defendant intended to aid a killing).
15 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987).
16 The question presented to the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari was the following:
Is the December 4, 1984, decision of the Arizona Supreme Court to execute these
petitioners in conflict with the holdings of this Court where, in the words of that court,
petitioners "did not specifically intend that the [victims] die, ... did not plot in advance
that these homicides would take place, or . did not actually pull the triggers on the
guns which inflicted the fatal wounds, .. ." but where that court fashioned an expanded
definition of "intent to kill" to include any situation where a non-triggerman "intended,
contemplated or anticipated that lethal force would or might be used or that life would
or might be taken in accomplishing the underlying felony?"
Brief for Petitioners at i; State v. Ricky Wayne Tison, 142 Ariz. 446, 690 P.2d 747 (1984); State v.
Raymond Curtis Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 690 P.2d 755 (1984) (No. 84-6075) [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioners).
17 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1688.
le id. at 1678.
ig Id. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's characterization of the facts,
and cited the record to demonstrate that Gary Tison planned the breakout for a year, mentioned
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Arizona State Prison carrying an ice chest filled with guns." The brothers armed their
father and a cellmate, Randy Greenawalt, and the group fled the prison without firing
a single shot. 2 ' Problems with their getaway vehicle forced the group to stop a passing
motorist and steal a car in order to continue their flight. 22 Posing as a motorist in need
of assistance, Raymond stood in front of the disabled vehicle, while the other four armed
themselves and waited by the side of the highway." John Lyons, his wife Donnelda, their
two-year old son Christopher, and a fifteen-year old niece, Theresa Tyson, stopped to
assist them. 24
The Tisons and Greenawalt commandeered the Lyons' car and kidnapped the
family." After the Tisons and Greenawalt drove the family away from the highway, Gary
Tison fired his shotgun into the radiator of the original getaway car, presumably to
ensure its inoperability." At the request of John Lyons, Gary Tison ordered his sons
Ricky and Raymond to get some water for the family. 27 According to Ricky, he and
Raymond gave the water jug to their father, who, along with Greenawalt, went behind
the disabled car and began shooting." Raymond's story differed somewhat. He recalled
being at the Lyons' car when the two heard the shotgun blasts. 29 Both Ricky and Raymond
agreed that they watched their father and Greenawalt repeatedly shoot the four victims."
All the victims ultimately died from the shooting.s 1 Neither Ricky nor Raymond made
any effort to help the family, though both expressed feeling surprised."
After the killings, the Tisons and Greenawalt continued their journey until the
police captured them several days later after a shootout at a roadblock." After the police
the idea to Raymond only one week before the escape and discussed the possibility of his sons'
participation only the day before. Id. at 1693 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 1678.
21 Id. The brothers testified that they conditioned their participation in the breakout on their
father's promise that no one was to be hurt. Raymond stated, "Well, I just think you should know
when we first came into this we had an agreement with my dad that nobody would get hurt because
we [the brothers] wanted no one hurt." State v. Raymond Curtis Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 462, 690
P.2d 755, 763 (1984) (citing Aggravation Hearing and Sentencing Transcript, March 14, 1979, at
159).
22 Man, 107 S. Ct. at 1678.
25 Id. at 1678-79.
25 Id. at 1679.
25 1d.
22 Id.
27 Id.
28 id,
22 Id.
" Id.
5I id,
52 1d. Brennan added that the Tisons expressed feelings of helplessness and regret, as well as
surprise. Id. at 1692 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Raymond stated about the shootings:
And when this [killing of the kidnap victims] came about we were not expecting it.
And it took us by surprise ... because we were not expecting this to happen. And 1
feel bad about it happening. I wish we could [have done] something to stop it, but by
the time it happened it was too late to stop it. And it's just something we are going to
live with the rest of our lives. It will always be there.
State v. Raymond Curtis Tison, 142 Ariz. 454,,462, 690 P.2d 755, 763 (1984) (citing Aggravation
Hearing and Sentencing Transcript, March 14, 1979, at 159).
" non, 107 S. Ct. at 1679. At the shootout, the third son, Donald Tison, was killed and Gary
Tison escaped into the desert where he eventually died. Id.
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apprehended them, the state jointly tried the Tison brothers and Randy Greenawalt for
the crimes associated with the prison escape and the shootout. 54
 In addition to charging
each of the Tisons with armed robbery,lidnapping and car theft, Arizona also charged
them with felony murder, a capital offense. 33
 Arizona state juries convicted both Ricky
and. Raymond Tison of 'felony murder. 36
.Arizona affords those found guilty of first degree murder a separate sentencing
hearing, before a single judge, to determine if the offense warrants the death penalty."
The statute lists six aggravating and four mitigating circumstances as guidelines to the
judge in his or her sentencing decision." The trial court - found three aggravating factors
34 Id. The Arizona trial court sentenced Randy Greenawalt to 30 years to life for the assaults
associated with the escape and for possession of a deadly weapon, and four to five years for escape,
t 
the sentences to run concurrently,•State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 388, 391;626 P.2d 118, 121, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 848 (1981). The trial court also sentenced Greenawalt to 30 years For the roadblock
assaults and four to five years for unlawful Hight and possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Id. These
sentences were to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentences arising out of
the escape. Id. Finally, all these sentences imposed on Greenawalt were to run consecutively to the
life term he was already serving prior to the escape. Id.
The state charged Dorothy Tison, Gary's wife, in connection with the escape. She pleaded nob
contendere to conspiracy and served a nine month prison term. Brief for Petitioners at 3 n.3 (citing
State v. Tison, Cr. No. 108352 (Maricopa County)).
35 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1679. The Arizona felony murder statute provided the basis for the
capital murder charges. Id. Section 13-452 of the•rizona Revised Statutes provides, in pertinent
part: "A. murder which is ... committed in avoiding or preventing lawful arrest or effecting an
escape from legal custody, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate ... robbery, ...
kidnapping, or mayhem ... is murder of the first degree." ARIZ. REV. STAT. 'ANN. 13-452 (Supp.
1957-1978) (amended 1 1973) (repealed 1978) (quoted in Brief for Petitioners at la-2a). Additionally,
section 13.139 provides: "WI persons concerned in the commission of a crime whether it is a felony
or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet
in its commission ... are principals' in any crime so committed." ARIZ.' REV. STAT. ANN:1 13-139
(1956) (repealed 1978) (quoted in Brief for Petitioners at la).
36 ∎Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1679-80. The state also convicted Ricky and Raymond Tison of aiding
and abetting an escape, assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and
unlawful flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle. State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 388, 391,
626 P.2d 118, 121, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 848 (1981). They each received concurrent sentences of
30 years to life for the assaults, and four to five years for the other crimes, which were to be served
concurrently, but consecutively to the sentences for assault. Id.
The statutory references in this note and infra notes 37-38 are to those. laws in effect at the
time the state convicted and sentenced the Tisons.
37
 Section 13-454(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes provides •that'lw]hen , the defendant is
found guilty of or pleads guilty to first degree murder, the judge who presided at the trial or before
whom the,guilty plea waventered shall conduCCa .iefiarate sentencing hearing ... for the purpose
of determining the'sentence to be imposed." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 1 13-454(A) (Supp. 1957-1978)
(repealed 1978) (cited in Brief for Petitioners at 2a).
Section 13-453 fixes the penalty for first degree murder at death or life imprisonment without
possibility of parole until 25 years have elapsed. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 1 13-453 (Supp. 1957-1978)
(amended 1973) (repealed 1978) (cited in Brief for Petitioners at 2a).
33
 Under sections 13-454(E)(1)—(6) of the Arizona Revised Statutes, which was repealed in 1978,
the Arizona court is to consider the following six aggravating circumstances:
I. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States for
which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable.
2. The -defendant was previously, convicted of a felony in the United States
involving the use or threat of violence on another person.
3. In the commission of the - offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk
of death to another person or persons in addition to the victim of the offense.
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present during the murder: the Tisons knowingly had created a grave risk of death to
persons other than the victims; the murders were committed with pecuniary gain; and
the murders were committed in a•especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner." The
judge found no statutory mitigating factors, but the court did determine the presence
of three nonstatutory factors: the Tisons' youth (Ricky was 20 and Raymond was 19);
the Tisons' minimal prior criminal records; and the murder convictions' basis in the
felony murder rule. 4° The trial judge also determined, however, that'both of the Tison
brothers 'substantially participated in the crimes that invoked the felony murder doc-
trine:" As a result of these findings, the judge sentenced both Ricky and Raymond to
death.45
On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the sentences. 43 1n its eval-
uation of the trial court's determination of aggravating factors, the Court found sufficient
evidence to support a finding of pecuniary gain and heinousness, but concluded that
insufficient evidence existed to find that the defendants created a grave risk of danger
to others:" 'ln addition, the Arizona Supreme Court specifically found that the brothers
did not pull the triggers, did not intend that the family die, and did not even know that
4. The defendant procured the coirimission of the offense by payment, or promise
of payment, of anything or pecuniary value.
5. ;The defendant committed the offense as •consideration for the receipt,. or in
expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
6. The defendant committed the offense in an especially'heinous, cruel, or de-
praved manner.
Ana. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E)(1)-(6) (Supp. 1957-1978) (cited in Brief for Petitioners at 3a-
4a). The four mitigating factors, according to section l3-454(1 7)(1)—(4), included the following:
1. His capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his
conduct,to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as
to constitute a defense to prosecution.
2. He was under unusual and substantial duressi-although not such as to constitute
a defense to prosecution.
3. lie was a principal, under § 13-452, Arizona Revised Statutes, in the offense,
which was committed by another,. but his participation was relatively minor, although
not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
4. He could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the course of the
commission of the offense for which he was convicted would cause, or would create a
grave risk of causing death to another person.
ARIZ. Ray. STA•. ANN. § 13-454(1 1)(1)—(4) (Supp. 1957-1978) (repealed 1978) (cited in Brief for
Petitioners at 4a).
Section 13-454(D) provides that death shall be imposed if one or more statutory aggravating
circumstances is found and no mitigating factors are found "sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(D) (Supp. 1957-1978) (repealed 1978) (cited in Brief for
Petitioners at 3a).
is See State v. Ricky Wayne Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 542, 633 P.2d 355, 351; State v. Raymond
Curtis Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 555, 633 P.2d 335, 364 (1981).
4 ' 1 See R.W. Tison, 129 Ariz, at 544, 633 P.2d at 353; R.C. Men, 129 Ariz. at 555, 633 P.2d at
364.
41 See 129 Ariz, at 545, 633 P.2d at 354 (quoting trial court).
42 See Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1680 (1987).
" H.W. Men, 129 Ariz. at 545, 633 P,2d at 354; R.C. Mon, 129 Ariz. at 557, 633 P.2d at 366.
44 R,W, Then, 129 Ariz. at 542-43, 633 P.2c1 at 351-52; R.C. Mon, 129 Ariz. at 555, 633 P,2d
at 364.
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the homicides would take place's In spite of these findings, the Arizona Supreme Court
determined that but for the Tisons' participation, the murders would not have tran-
spired, and, as a result, affirmed their capital sentences. 46 The United States Supreme
Court then denied the brothers' writ for certiorari. 47
Both Ricky and Raymond Tison collaterally attacked their death sentences. 48 They
claimed that their sentences did not satisfy the Enmund v. Florida" test, which required
a defendant to kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill before the state could sentence him
or her to death." The Arizona Supreme Court found Enmund fulfilled, reasoning that
Ricky and Raymond possessed the requisite intent because each could have anticipated
the use of lethal forces' The Tison brothers subsequently petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court ultimately granted."
In a five to four decision," the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case back
to Arizona and held that the Arizona Supreme Court applied an erroneous standard in
making the findings Enmund v. Florida required.54 In its holding, the Court determined
that substantial participation in a felony combined with reckless indifference to human
life sufficed to satisfy the Enmund culpability standard. 55 Thus, according to the Court,
sentencing a person to death under these circumstances does not violate the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 56 Justice Brennan, in
45 R.W. Tison, 129 Ariz, at 545, 633 P.2d at 354. The Arizona Supreme Court made the following
finding:
The record establishes that both Ricky and Raymond Tison were present when the
homicides took place and that they occurred as part of and in the course of the escape
and continuous attempt to prevent recapture. The deaths would not have occurred
but for their assistance. That they did not specifically intend that the Lyonses and
Theresa Tyson die, that they did not plot in advance that these homicides would take
place, or that they did not actually pull the triggers on the guns which inflicted the
fatal wounds is of little significance.
Id.
15 /d. at 557, 633 P.2d at 366. 	 <3
47
 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
413
 The Tisons challenged their sentences by filing a petition for post-conviction relief and a
motion for rehearing. State v. Ricky Wayne Tison, 142 Ariz. 446, 447, 690 P.2d 747, 748 (1984);
State v. Raymond Curtis Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 455-56, 690 P.2d 755, 756-57 (1984).
" 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
"Ricky Wayne Tison, 142 Ariz. at 447, 690 P.2d at 748; Raymond Curtis Tison, 142 Ariz. at 456,
690 P.2d at 757.
51 Ricky Wayne Tison, 142 Ariz. at 448, 690 P.2d at 749; Raymond Curtis Tison, 142 Ariz. at 457,
690 P.2d at 758. It appears that the Arizona Supreme Court ignored its finding made three years
earlier that the Tisons did not intend that the killings take place. See supra note 45. Instead, the
Arizona Supreme Court determined from ,the circumstances of the escape and subsequent events
that Ricky and Raymond Tison could anticipate the use of lethal force and, hence, intended to kill.
Ricky Wayne Tison, 142 Ariz, at 448, 690 P.2d at 749; Raymond Curtis Tison, 142 Ariz. at 456, 690
P.2d at 757. The United States Supreme Court indicated that this interpretation of intent was
erroneous. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1684.
52
 107 S. Ct. 1182 (1986).
53 See Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1678. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion for the majority in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Powell, and Scalia joined. Justice Brennan filed
a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined and in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens
joined in part.
Id. at 1688.
55 Id,
56 Id.
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a sharply critical dissenting opinion, argued that the majority's test not only contravened
precedent, state legislative and sentencing trends, and constitutional principles of pro-
portionality, but also clouded the already unclear issue of when the death penalty applies
to a particular set of facts."
The Tison Court, when compared with Enmund, has created a new standard for
determining when death is a permissible sanction for a person convicted under a felony
murder statute. States may now impose capital punishment on individuals who do not
intend to kill, so long as that individual substantially participated in the underlying
felony and manifested a reckless indifference to human life. Under Tison, the intentional
actor and the recklessly indifferent actor may receive the same punishment. The Tison
Court's reasoning in support of the new standard, however, is faulty. The Court relied
on state and judicial responses to felony murder where intent is absent; yet, upon closer
examination, the trend in state legislatures and courts is to decline imposing the death
penalty on an individual who did not kill or intend to take life. Finally, when the Tison
reckless indifference test is analyzed in light of prior Supreme Court warnings against
the arbitrariness of capital sentencing, the test must fail the eighth amendment's cruel
and unusual prohibition.
The first section of this casenote will explore the historical developments of the
eighth amendment" and the death penalty, 59 as well as common law and statutory
approaches to the felony murder doctrine." Section two will summarize the majority
and dissenting" opinions in Then v. Arizona and the reasoning advanced in support of
both positions. Section three of this casenote will criticize Tison in light of precedent,
state and judicial sentencing trends, and constitutional principles of proportionality."
Finally, the fourth section will analyze the implications of the Tison decision on capital
sentencing in the future." This casenote will propose that, to acknowledge precedent
and the states' responses to felony murder, and to inject some consistency in capital
sentencing cases, the Court should abandon the Tison's reckless indifference standard
and return to the Enmund test."
1. BACKGROUND
A. The Eighth Amendment
Courts have struggled with what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under
the eighth amendment." The provision's elasticity perhaps is described best in Chief
57 See generally id. at 1688-1702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 74-106 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 107-62 and accompanying text,
"' See infra notes 163-93 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 196-234 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 241-318 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 319-25 and accompanying text,
65 See infra notes 326-28 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,171 (1976) (eighth amendment "has been interpreted
in a flexible and dynamic manner"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,258 (1972) (''the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment clause, ... is not susceptible of precise definition") (Brennan, J., concurring);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,135-36 (1878) (IdJifficulty would attend the effort to define with
exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punish-
ment shall not be inflicted").
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Justice Warren's comments in the 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles: "The Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."67
Although courts may agree that the precise meaning of "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" is unclear, they dispute the purposes of the clause. As a result, several theories
have been proffered. Some courts have claimed that the drafters included the amend-
ment to prevent the government from imposing punishment disproportionate to the
crime committed.68
 Others point out that the language suggests that the drafters sought
to protect the criminal by outlawing sanctions that involve wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain.88
In light of the imprecision that has accompanied efforts to define the eighth amend-
ment and its underlying purposes, the courts have fashioned guidelines in interpreting
the meaning of the clause and distinguishing cruel and unusual punishment from
permissible punishment. Some of these rules are mechanical. For example, courts have
interpreted the provision to invalidate punishments deemed inhumane, barbarous, or
torturous," or punishment unknown at common law. 71
 The Supreme Court though, in
the last half century, has moved away from this technical inquiry and toward a more
The eighth amendment provides that le]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
67
 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
fit' See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286-87 (1983) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 367 (1910)). See also O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), where Justice Field, dissenting,
wrote: "The inhibition [of the eighth amendment] is directed, ... against all punishments which
by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." Id. at
339-40. (Field, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court, in a decision made eighty-five years after O'Neil, employed the logic of
Justice Field to reverse the capital sentence of a defendant convicted of rape. See Colter v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
66 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) ("primary concern of drafters was to
proscribe torture") (citing G ran ucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Puriishmeng Inflicted: The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. Rev. 839, 842 (1969)); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (punishment must not involve wanton
infliction of pain).
7° See Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 533 (10th Cir. 1979) (cruel and -thriiisual means soMeihing
inhuman and barbarous); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967) ("cruel and unusual
conduct was aimed at preventing a recurrence of torture and ba'rbarditsTh'imishments"); Black v.
United States, 269 F.2d 38, 43 (9th Cir. 1959) (eighth amendment prevents inhiliairrand Carbarous
punishment); Mayberry v. Robinson, 427 F. Supp. 297, 310 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (cruel and unusual is
inhuman and barbarous treatment). For examples of punishments that courts have considered to
be barbarous or torturous, see O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 363 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)
(use of the rack, thumbscrews invalid); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 57-58, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (1952)
("pillory, burning at stake, breaking on the wheel, drawing and quartering and the like"); King v.
State, 75 Okla. Crim. 210, 215, 130 P.2d 105, 108 (Okla. Crim. App. 1942) (whipping post,
dismemberment, mutilation) (quoting Ellis v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 295, 298, 19 P.2d 972, 974
(Okla. Crim. App. 1933)).
7 ' See In re Pinaire, 46 F. Supp. 113, 113 (N.D. Tex. 1942) (cruel and unusual prohibition
implies some punishment unknown at common law). For judicial interpretation of state constitutions
forbidding cruel and unusual punishment see People ex rd Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory,
148 III. 413, 421, 36 N.E. 76, 79 (1894) (precludes cruel and degrading sanctions or punishments
not known at common law); Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 63, 196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (1946)
(cruel and unusual applies to punishments unknown at common law).
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conceptual analysis. Under this approach, public attitudes" and whether a sanction
accords with or is degrading to human dignity" measure the constitutionality of a
particular punishment.
B. The Death Penally
Although the death penalty predates the eighth amendment, it remains one of the
most controversial issues of eighth amendment jurisprudence. Capital punishment ap-
peared as an acceptable means of punishment in colonial America as early as 1656." By
the time the states ratified the Constitution in 1789, states commonly used death as a
penalty for criminal offenses:75
In 1869 in Wilkerson v. Utah, one of the earliest eighth amendment cases the Supreme
Court considered, the Court tacitly approved the death penalty's constitutionality." The
Wilkerson Court concluded that the Constitution permitted a public shooting as a means
of execution." After commenting that the prisoner's counsel did not object to death in
itself as cruel and unusual, but rather the means of inflicting death," the Wilkerson Court
further stated that the category of punishments prohibited by the eighth amendment
did not include death by public shooting."
At other times, the Court has gone beyond tacit approval and has expressly sanc-
tioned the death penalty's constitutionality. In 1890 in In re Kemmler, the Court addressed
the issue of whether electrocution constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the
fourteenth amendment. 8° The Court held electrocution to be a permissible means of
imposing death, carefully distinguishing, between the penalty itself and its implementa-
tion." Chief Justice Fuller wrote in Kemmler that the eighth amendment impliedly en-
compassed "something more than the mere extinguishment of life." 82 Fifty years later,
" See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 332 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (punishment
"may be invalid if popular sentiment abhors it").
" See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (penalty must accord with dignity of man) (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)); Furman, 408 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring) (severity of
punishment must not be degrading to human dignity); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(eighth amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency").
74 See Furman, 408 U.S, at 335 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Hookins, The Capitall Lowes of
New-England, HARV. L. Scii. BULL. 10-11 (Feb. 1956)).
" Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177.
" 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878).
77 Id.
" Id. at 136-37.
79 Id. at 134-35. The Wilkerson Court stated:
Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but the authorities
referred to are quite sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of
executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not included
in that category, within the meaning of the eighth amendment.
Id.
89 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890). The petitioners presented the issue under the fourteenth amend-
ment because at that time, the eighth amendment applied only to the federal government, Not .
until the 1960 case of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), did the Supreme Court hold
the eighth amendment applicable to the states.
Si Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
92 Id. Chief Justice Fuller wrote: Iplunishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used
in the Constitution. it implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life." Id.
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in the 1940 case of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber," the Court again focused on the
mode of execution; the Court never questioned the validity of the death penalty itself."
A 1972 case provided the Supreme Court with an excellent opportunity to assess
the death penalty's constitutionality as a punishment, apart from the means used to
inflict death; yet the Court balked at the chance to speak as a coherent whole. In the
landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, 85 the Court considered the validity of three state
capital punishment statutes. The Court also addressed the claim that the death penalty,
in and of itself, constituted cruel and unusual punishment and thereby violated the
eighth amendment." The Furman Court never resolved the issue of the death penalty's
constitutionality. Two justices found the death penalty unconstitutional on its lam" four
justices reached the opposite result.," and three justices, though declaring the statutes
before the Court unconstitutional, left open the question of whether death was ever an
appropriate punishment."
Four years after Furman, the Court again confronted the issue of the death penalty's
constitutionality. This time, in Gregg v. Georgia, 9° the Court issued a much less ambiguous
opinion than in Furman. In a plurality opinion written by Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, the Court declared that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional. 91
Although the Court has in subsequent cases held that the death penalty's imposition
violates the eighth amendment in certain circumstances,92 the proposition that capital
punishment is not, in and of itself, unconstitutional remains valid constitutional law.
The Gregg Court provided several justifications for its conclusion that the death
penalty did not offend the notion of cruel and unusual punishment. First, the Court
recognized that capital punishment had long been applied in both the United Kingdom
and the United States. 93 Second, the Court noted that the post-Furman legislative re-
sponse to capital punishment indicated that society at large regarded death as an appro-
priate response to certain crimes." Third, the infrequency of juries' imposing the death
83 329 U.S. 459 (1947). In Resweber, the Court addressed whether a second execution, needed
because a mechanical failure on the first attempt did not kill the defendant, constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. In a live to four decision, the Court held that it did not. Id. at 465-66.
84 Id. at 464. Justice Reed, writing for a plurality, asserted: "[t]he cruelty against which the
Constitution protects .. . is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary
suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely." Id.
85
 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
86 Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 369-70 (Marshall, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 375 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id. at 408 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 419
(Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-11 (White,
J., concurring).
88 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
I Id. at 187. Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Powell stated: "(w .le hold that the death penalty is
not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the
offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in
reaching the decision to impose it." Id.
82
 See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of limitations placed on the
imposition of the death penalty.
83 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176. The Gregg Court stated that "Nile common-law rule imposed a
mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers." Id. at 176-77 (citing McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 197-98 (1971)).
94 Id. at 179, 183. In Gregg, the Court cited to at least 35 states that had, since the Furman
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penalty on convicted defendants, the Court commented, further strengthened the prop-
osition that death deserved application in a small number of extreme cases." Finally, the
Gregg Court concluded that the death penalty served a penological purpose."
The Gregg Court explained that capital punishment furthered two important social
goals: retribution and deterrence of future capital crimes." With respect to retribution,
the Gregg Court noted that the death penalty, in part, expressed society's outrage at
certain conduct." Although the Court recognized that retribution was not the primary
goal of the criminal justice system, it did acknowledge that capital punishment was
necessary to prevent individuals from resorting to self-help means of achieving justice.'"
Deterrence as a goal of capital punishment has generated far more controversy than
retribution because of the ambiguous statistics supporting the punishment's actual de-
terrent value. 10 ' Despite the lack of empirical evidence on the number of felons deterred
from committing murder, the Supreme Court still acknowledges deterrence as one of
the death penalty's two primary purposes.'"
decision, enacted statutes providing for the death penalty in certain circumstances. Id. at 179-80.
Moreover, Congress even had declared death to be an appropriate response to aircraft piracy
resulting in death. Id. at 180 (citing Antihijacking Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C.'§§ 1472(1), (n) (1970 &
Supp. IV)). But see id. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting) for an argument claiming that the passage
of such statutes in the 35 states is not conclusive as to the general public's opinion.
95 Id. at 182 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 388 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). In
Furman, Chief Justice Burger stated:
The selectivity of juries in imposing the punishment of death is properly viewed as a
refinement on, rather than a repudiation of, the statutory authorization for that
penalty .... Given the general awareness that death is no longer a routine punishment
for the crimes for which it is made available it is hardly surprising that juries have
been increasingly meticulous in their imposition of the penalty.
408 U.S. at 388 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
99 See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-87.
91 Id. at 183. Some advocates have advanced a third purpose for the death penalty. The death
penalty, under this approach, is thought to incapacitate dangerous criminals and prevent crimes
that they might otherwise commit in the future. Id. at 183 n.28 (citing People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.
3d 628, 651, 493 P.2d 880, 896, 100 Cal. Rptr, 152, 167-68, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972);
Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242, 258-59, 339 N.E.2d 676, 685-86 (1975)).
99 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
99 Id.
00 Id. The Gregg Court stated that capital punishment was "essential in an ordered society that
asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs." Id.
101 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 & n.31 (citing Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich
and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359 (1976); Baldus & Core, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin
and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Ehrlich, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 Am, EcoN. REV. 397 ( June
1975)). The Gregg plurality concluded that "[t]he results [evaluating the worth of the death penalty
as a deterrent to crime] simply have been inconclusive." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185. The Gregg plurality
continued, "although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as a
significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evidence either
supporting or refuting this view." Id. (footnote omitted); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at
347 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("This [not knowing how many have refrained front murder because
of the fear of death] is the nub of the problem and it is exacerbated by the paucity of useful data.").
102 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183). In fact, as
the Gregg Court pointed out:
We may ... assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion,
for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others,
the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent, There are carefully content-
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In light of the eighth amendment's purposes and the death penalty's goals, the
Court has placed several limitations on the death penalty in an effort to define the
parameters of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. First, that which is tor-
turous or amounts to a lingering death is clearly unconstitutional.'" Second, a sentencer
violates the eighth amendment in imposing death where death is disproportionate to the
crime conunitted. 1 " A third restriction on capital punishment states that the sentencer
must have some discretion in imposing death, or, in other words, mandatory capital
sentences are cruel and unusual.'° 5 Fourth, and finally, where a sentencer administers
the death penalty in a freakish or arbitrary manner, the Constitution demands the capital
sentence's vacation.'" A felony murder case, where the defendant sentenced to death
did not actually kill, but rather participated in a felony that caused another's death,
further tests the eighth amendment's boundaries.
C. The Felony Murder Doctrine
The felony murder rule has its origins in the English common law.'" Simply stated,
the common law doctrine held that one who causes the death of another during the
commission of a felony may be charged with murder.'" As the number of crimes
constituting felonies increased, the courts alleviated the rule's harshness by requiring
that the felony be violentm and that the death be a natural and probable consequence
plated murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible penalty of death may
well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act. And there are some
other categories of murder, such as murder,by a life prisoner, where other sanctions
may not be adequate.
428 U.S. at 185-86 (footnote omitted).
105 See supra note 70.
1 " See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 n.4 (1977) (death is disproportionate for the
crime of rape and therefore violates the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual provision); see also
supra note 7.
105
 See, e.g.. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (Louisiana's mandatory death
sentence statute unconstitutional); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (North
Carolina's mandatory capital sentence violates eighth and fourteenth amendments).
106 See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976) (eighth amendment satisfied by elimi-
nating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in imposition of death); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (eighth amendment is supposed "to requi a legislatures
to write penal laws that are even-handed, nonselective and nonarbitrary, and to requ:re judges to
see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups").
Justice Brennan, concurring in the opinion, said: "[i]ndeed, the very words 'cruel and unusual
punishments' imply condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe punishments." Furman, 408
U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, also concurring, stated that "[t]he Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishh; imposed." Furman, 408
U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Moore v. Balkcom, 716 F.2d 1511, 1520 (11th Cir.
1983) ("[The] cases have emphasized that discretion need not be eliminated from capital punishment
mechanisms; rather, the Supreme Court has focused in channeling discretion to minimize the risk
of arbitrary decision making.").
WI See Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50, 58
(1956) (citing Lord Dacres' Case, 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535)).
1°a
	 & Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 71, at 545 (1972).
109 Id. at 545-56.
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of the offense."° The United States felony murder rule developed from this English
common law."
In the United States, common law provided that murder included a death resulting
from the commission of a felony." 2 American courts, like their counterparts in England,
restricted the scope of the felony murder doctrine by limiting its application. For ex-
, uple, some jurisdictions required that the felony be inherently dangerous)" Addition-
ally, some states have held that the felony had to be recognizable at common law.'" Still
another method some courts employed was that the felony in question must be malum
in se rather than malum prohibitum." 5
The felony murder rule requires that the homicide occur during the commission of
a felony."° Thus, the rule is inoperable in cases where there is a break in the chain of
events leading from the initial felony to the murder. 17 The commission of the felony
requirement. is satisfied where the homicide and felony are part of the same transac-
tion. 113
n° Id. (citing Regina v. Horsey, 176 Eng. Rep. 129 (Assiz. 1862)).
in See, e.g., State v. Foster, 293 N.G. 674, 687, 239 S.E.2d 449, 458 (1977) (-felony murder' is
an abbreviation for a homicide committed in the commission of or attempt to commit a felony
'which is inherently dangerous to human life or foreseeably dangerous to human life") (quoting
State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 72, 199 S.E.2d 409, 412 (1973)).
"2 See Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 267 (1)el. 1967), reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 995 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Guida, 341 l'a. 305, 308, 19 A.2d 98, 100 (1941).
"3 See, e.g., People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 780, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442,
445 (1965) (felony murder ascribes malice to "felon who kills in perpetration of an inherently
dangerous felony"); People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 565, 199 N.W. 373, 374 (1924) (sale of liquor,
although a felony, "is an act not itself directly and naturally dangerous to life").
"4 See, e.g., Pala., 227 Mich. at 505, 568, 199 N.W. at 374-75 (1924) (selling liquor is a statutory
felony but riot a common law felony and therefore conviction for manslaughter could not stand);
Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 156-65, 89 A. 968, 969-71 (1914) (shock resulting in death
from statutory rape not murder because statutory rape not a common law felony).
" 5 See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 108, § 71, at 547 (citing Reddick v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky.
L. Rptr. 1020, 33 S.W. 416 (1895); People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924)).
Malum in se is "[a] wrong in itself; an act ... involving illegality from the very nature of the
transaction . . .." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 865 (5th ed. 1979).
Malum prohibilum is "[a] wrong prohibited; ... an act which is not inherently immoral, but
becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law," Id.
"6 See, e.g., State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 631, 664 P.2d 1358, 1369 (1983) ("No invoke the
felony murder rule, there must be proof that a homicide was committed in the perpetration of or
in attempt to perpetrate a felony and that the collateral felony was one inherently dangerous to
human life") (citing State v. Smith, 225 Kan. 796, 799-800, 594 P.2d 218, 221 (1979)); Payne v.
State, 81 Nev. 503, 505, 406 P.2d 922, 924 (1965) ("felony murder rule . . . is that any homicide
committed while perpetrating or attempting a felony is first degree murder").
17 See, e.g., People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 148, 186 N.E. 422, 424 (1933) ("where there is no
reasonable doubt of a complete intervening desistance from the crime, as by the abandonment of
the loot and running away, the subsequent homicide is not murder without proof of deliberation
and intent") (citation omitted).
See People v. Goddard, 135 Mich. App. 128, 136, 352 N.W.2d 367, 371 (1984) ("homicide
must be incident to the felony and associated with it as one of its hazards"); Bassett v. Common-
wealth, 222 Va. 844, 855-56, 284 S.E,2d 844, 851-52 (1981) (defendant properly convicted of
felony murder where murder committed at a location different from where robbery occurred and
fifteen to twenty minutes later) (citing Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532, 543-44, 273 S.E.2d
48, 55-56 (1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938 (1982)); cf. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596,
602-03, 68 A.2d 595, 599 (1949) (killing can take place during escape but need not occur at same
time as felony), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950).
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In addition to demonstrating a temporal relationship between the underlying felony
and the murder, a state, to invoke the felony murder doctrine, must establish the
defendant's frame of mind. Unlike the common law, which required intent as a necessary
component of a crime," felony murder's elements do not include an intent to take a
person's life.'" To convict a person of felony murder, a state is obliged to prove only
that the defendant intended to commit the felony that accompanied the homicide. In
essence, the felony murder rule transfers the defendant's intent from the underlying
felony to the murder.I 21
Application of the felony murder rule affects all who participated in the underlying
felony. The rule operates to make each felon, including the nontriggerperson, criminally
liable for the victim's death.' 22
 In states authorizing the death penalty for felony murder,
such authorization implicates the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment if the defendant did not in fact kill the victim. Prior to Enmund,
the Supreme Court had not directly addressed the constitutionality of imposing death
on those persons convicted of felony murder who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend
to kill.
In the 1978 case of Lockett v. Ohio, the Supreme Court considered the constitution-
ality of the Ohio death penalty statute, which limited the sentencer's discretion in weigh-
ing the circumstances of the crime and the offender's record and character as mitigating
factors.'" The Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional and reversed the
" 9 See State v. Tabasso Homes, Inc., 42 Del. 110, 121, 28 A.2d 248, 254 (1942); State v. O'Neil,
147 Iowa 513, 519, 126 N.W. 454, 456 (1910); Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 142, 93
N.E. 249, 249 (1910); State v. Ryan, 70 N.H. 196, 196-97, 46 A. 49, 49 (1900) (quoting State v.
Cornish, 66 N.H. 329, 330, 21 A. 180, 181 (1890)).
In See, e.g., State v. Ferrari, 112 Aria. 324, 328, 541 P.2d 921, 925 (1975) (murder resulting
from burglary is murder in first degree whether willful and premeditated or only accidental);
People v. Chapman, 261 Cal. App. 2d 149, 165, 67 Cal. Rptr. 601, 611 (1968) ("A killing in the
perpetration of a robbery is murder of the first degree, whether willful and premeditated or only
accidental and whether or not it is planned as part of the robbery.") (citations omitted); People v.
Ulsh, 211 Cal. App. 2d 258, 272, 27 Cal. Rptr. 408, 417 (1962) (killing in perpetration of robbery
is first degree murder, whether it was intentional or accidental).
' 2 ' See, e.g., People v. William M.T., 82 Misc. 2d 308, 309, 369 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (Nassau Cty
Ct. 1975) (felony murder is unintentional killing where the element of evil intent is transferred
from underlying felony to the killing).
' 99 See People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438, 452, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133, 143 (1974) (accomplice
guilty of homicide, just like actual killer); Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 441, 94 So. 865, 870 (1922)
(one who was present and aided and abetted the felonious act is to be punished like the one who
committed the felony); People v. Jeffrey, 94 III. App. 3d 455, 460, 418 N.E.2d 880, 885-86 (1981)
(defendant can be convicted of felony murder even though he did not intend to kill or kill victim);
Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640, 643, 313 A.2d 563, 566 (1974) (each and any accomplice
engaged in felony is responsible for murder). For a list of state felony murder statutes, see Note,
The Felony Murder Rule and the Death Penalty; Enmund v. Florida - Overreaching by the Supreme Court?
19 New ENG. L. REV. 255, 259 n.23 (1983). For a discussion of agency and proximate cause theories
of criminal culpability, see id. at 260-61.
For a discussion of accessory law and its application to the felony murder rule, see generally
Dressler, The Jurisprudence of Death by Another: Accessories and Capital Punishment, 51 U. Coto. L. REV.
17, 44-47 (1979).
129
 438 U.S. 586, 589 (1978). In Lockett, Sandra Lockett and three others planned to rob a pawn
shop. Id. at 590. While Lockett sat in the getaway car with the engine running, her two cofelons
robbed and killed the storeowner. Id. As a result of Lockett's participation in the robbery and
murder, Ohio charged Lockett with and convicted her of aggravated murder under Ohio law and
September 1988]	 CASENOTES	 983
petitioner's death sentence.'" One issue the Court did not address as a coherent body
was whether death was a disproportionate penalty for a felony murder committed by a
nontriggerperson who did not attempt or intend to kill)" Several Justices, however,
commented on this question. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the opinion, stated in a
footnote that the eighth amendment should not require that the defendant actually
intend to kill because other means existed to measure culpability under the cruel and
unusual clause. 1 28 Justice White, dissenting in part, adopted the opposite position, as-
serting that the state could not constitutionally impose the death penalty without a finding
that the defendant had a conscious purpose to kill. 127 Thus, although Lockett raised the
issue of the death penalty's constitutionality in the felony murder context, the Court
tailed to articulate a sound means of analysis in dealing with the issue. Thus, the felony
murder doctrine has significant consequences for the potential felon. So long as a
homicide occurs during the commission of a felony, an individual may be held responsible
for murder whether or not he or she was the triggerperson. Imposing death on one
who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill, but who was convicted of murder
under a state's felony murder statute, raises important constitutional issues. In Lockett,
individual Justices commented on these issues. Not until the 1982 case of Enmund v.
Florida,'" did the Supreme Court address the constitutionality of sentencing to death the
nontriggerperson felon who lacked an intent to kill.
D. Enmund v. Florida and its Progeny
On April I, 1975, Sampson and Jeannette Armstrong entered the central Florida
home of Thomas and Eunice Kersey, robbing and killing them. 129 Earl Enmund, seated
in a getaway car by the side of the road, waited to help his cofelons escape. 13° Florida
sentenced her to death. Id. at 593-94. Part of her defense rested on her belief that her co-defendants
were simply going to the store to pawn a ring. Id. at 592.
The State's case against Lockett depended upon the testimony of Al Parker, a cordon and the
one who admittedly shot and killed the pawnshop owner. Id. at 589. According to Parker's descrip-
tion of Lockett's role, Lockett herself first suggested the others could get sonic money by robbing
a grocery store and a nearby furniture store. Id. at 590. When this plan fell apart, Lockett's brother
suggested robbing a pawnshop. Id, Since Lockett knew the owner, she would not be the one to
enter the store. Id. Lockett did, however, guide the others to the store and waited in the car while
they committed the robbery. Id.
12'
	
at 606. Chief Justice Burger, in delivering the opinion of the Court, declared the Ohio
statute unconstitutional because it did not "permit the type of individualized consideration of
mitigating factors ... required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases." Id.
125
	 at 609 n.16.
126 Id. at 614-15 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun wrote that the eighth amend-
ment should not require a finding of intent to kill, for such a rule "is an incomplete method of
ascertaining culpability for Eighth Amendment purposes, which necessarily is a more subtle mixture
of action, inaction, and degrees of mew rea." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
'" Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
1211
 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
129 Id. at 783-84.
' 30 1d. at 784-86. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the only reasonable inference
that could be drawn front the evidence was that Eninund helped the robbers escape. Enmund v.
State, 399 So.2d 1362, 1370 (Fla. 1981). The Florida Supreme Court wrote: Tribe only evidence
of the degree of his (Ertmund's1 participation is the jury's likely inference that he was the person
in the car by the side of the road near the scene of the crimes. The jury could have concluded that
be was there, a few hundred feet away, waiting to help the robbers escape with the Kersey's money."
Id.
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charged all three"' with first degree murder and robbery. Juries found both Enmund
and Sampson Armstrong guilty of the two counts each of first degree murder and
recommended death for both defendants.'" The Florida Supreme Court affirmed En-
mund's conviction and sentence."' The United States Supreme Court granted Enmund's
petition for certiorari's' to determine the issue of whether death is a constitutionally
permissible sentence for one who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill.'"
In Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment precluded
the imposition of the death penalty on a person who "aids and abets a felony in the
course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt
to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed."' 36 The
Court reached this conclusion by adopting an approach that used as many objective
factors as the record before the Court would allow.'" Among other factors, the Enmund
Court considered legislative judgments and jury sentencing decisions before offering its
own judgment.'"
The Enmund Court's survey of felony murder and sentencing statutes revealed that
only eight jurisdictions allowed the death penalty solely because the defendant partici-
pated in a robbery during which another robber killed.'" Nine additional states, the
Court found, permitted an execution absent a defendant's intent to kill if sufficient
aggravating circumstances existed. 146 In sum, the Court noted that only one third of
American jurisdictions imposed capital sentences on felons who participated in a robbery
where a homicide occurred.' 41 Although the Court did not find unanimity among the
states,' 42
 it concluded that such legislative responses to the situation where a defendant
did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill suggested a rejection of the death penalty
13 ' The state tried Jeanette Armstrong separately and convicted her of two counts of second
degree murder and one count of robbery; she received three consecutive life terms. Enmund v.
State, 399 So.2d at 1371.
1S2 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 785. The Florida murder statute at the time of the conviction read in
pertinent part: "The unlawful killing of a human being, when ... committed by a person engaged
in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any robbery ... shall be murder in the first
degree and shall constitute a capital felony ...." FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1973) (reprinted in Enmund,
399 So.2d at 1370).
The Supreme Court stated that the trial court, in its required written findings, found no
mitigating factors and four aggravating factors. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 785. These aggravating factors
included•"defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of an armed robbery,
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d) (1981); the felony was committed for pecuniary gain, § 921.141(5)(f); it
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h); and Enmund was previously convicted
of a felony involving the use or threat of violence, § 921.141(5)(b)." Id. (citing 399 So.2d 362, 371-
72 (Fla. 1981)). The Florida Supreme Court treated the factors of robbery and pecuniary gain as
one and accepted the prior conviction of a violent felony as an aggravating factor. It rejected the
finding that the felony was cruel, heinous or atrocious. Enmund, 399 So.2d at 1373.
Enmund, 399 So.2d at 1373.
134 454 U.S. 939 (1981).
	 .
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787.
15 ' Id. at 797.
"7 Id. at 788.
08 Id. at 788-89.
09 Id. at 789.
09 /d. at 791.
141 Id, at 792.
142 Id. at 792-93 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977)).
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in such cases. 143 In its examination of jury sentencing in felony murder cases,'" the
Enmund Court found convincing evidence that juries repudiated death as a punishment
for such criminals as Earl Enmund.' 45
The Court next compared death as a penalty for robbery in the abstract to the
robbery that Enmund committed. In the abstract, the Court commented, robbery was
dissimilar to murder, and hence, death was an excessive punishment for the robber.'I'l
In Enmund's case in particular, the Court stressed that because Enmund did not kill or
intend to kill, he deserved different treatment than the intentional killer. 1 .17 Additionally,
the Court concluded that the eighth amendment prohibited Florida from attributing to
Enmund the Armstrongs' culpability. 145 Therefore, the Court held that capital punish-
ment for Enmund constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 149
Finally, the Court examined whether the death penalty, when applied to one in
Enmund's position, advanced capital punishment's retributive or deterrent goals. 15" The
Court was unconvinced that putting Enmund to death for two killings that he did not
commit or intend to commit contributed to the retributory goals because retribution
depended on culpability and intention, and Enmund did not intend either of the kill-
ings. 15 ' Moreover, the Court expressed its doubt that capital punishment would deter
those who never intended to take another's life.'"
Four years later, in Cabana v. Bullock, the Supreme Court again faced a case in which
a nontriggerperson felon was sentenced to death.'" In Cabana, Mississippi convicted
Crawford Bullock of capital murder under its felony murder statute.'" Although Cabana
"' Id. at 793,
i" The Enmund Court relied on the plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, which stated: " . [T]he
jury ... is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly
involved.'" Id. at 794 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 596, quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 181 (1976)).
145 Id. at 794. The Enmund Court asserted that "[Ole evidence is overwhelming that American
juries have repudiated imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as [Earl Enmund's]." Id. In
all reported appellate decisions since 1954 where a defendant was executed for homicide, only 6
of 362 were nontriggerpersons and their executions all occurred in 1955. Id. at 794-95.
The nature of the nation's death row population also indicates that juries have rejected the
death penalty for the defendant who did not kill, was not present at the killing, and did nut
participate or plan to murder the victim, Id. at 795 (citing Appendix E to Brief for Petitioner;
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row U.S.A. (Oct. 20, 1981)). Of the
739 inmates under sentences of' death for whom sufficient information is available, 41 did not
participate in the killings; of the 40 of these for whom information is available, 16 were not present
and of these, only 3 were sentenced to die despite no finding that they participated in a scheme
intended to kill the victim. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795.
14 " Id. at 797 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 184). The Court noted that by definition,
robbery did not include the death of or serious injury to another. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S, at 598). According to the majority, victims of murders and robberies were clearly distin-
guishable because For the former, their lives were over, a fact untrue for the latter. Id.
147 Id. at 798.
155 Id.
"" Id.
'" See id, at 798-801.
151 Id. at 801.
1" Id. at 798-99.
m 106 S. Ct. 689 (1986).
154 Id. at 693-94.
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primarily involved the federal court's role in an Enmund-based appeal,' 55 the Court in
dicta ended any speculation as to Enmund's scope. The Cabana Court, in unequivocal
terms, asserted that Enmund imposed the categorical rule that a state could not remain
faithful to the eighth amendment if it executed a person who had not killed, attempted
to kill, or intended to kill's"
Since 1982, federal courts have consistently followed the Enmund doctrine. Thus,
federal courts have required a finding that a defendant killed, attempted to kill, or
intended to kill before they would affirm a death sentence. 157 Although the Enmund
standard would permit a court to order an execution if a nontriggerperson intended
that lethal force would be employed,'" federal courts have not affirmed death sentences
solely on this ground.' 59
Enmund has also governed state proceedings. Thus, state trial courts must also find
the requisite intent to kill before imposing a capital sentence. 160 Although in many cases,
state appellate courts have affirmed death sentences, 16 ' states have used the Enmund
standard to vacate a death sentence where no finding was made that the defendant
killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. 162
155 Id. at 693, 699-700. The Court concluded that the federal habeas court must examine the
entire state court record in order to determine whether the Enmund finding had been made. See
id. at 697. Where the state courts have failed to make any finding regarding the Enmund criteria,
the Supreme Court held that the state may either vacate the death penalty and impose a sentence
of life imprisonment or the state may make a determination, from its own judicial system, that the
defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Id. at 699-700.
158 Id. at 697.
137 See, e.g., McKenzie v. Risley, 801 F.2d 1519, 1530 (9th Cir. 1986) (Enmund indicated finding
of "intent may be a condition precedent to the imposition of the death penalty"); Roach v. Martin,
757 F.2d 1463, 1483 (4th Cir. 1985) (death sentence valid under Enmund because record indicates
that Roach killed or contemplated that a killing take place); Hitchcock v. Wainwright, 745 F.2d
1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 1984) ("A defendant cannot be sentenced to death for participating in a
felony with no intent to participate in a murder.") (citation omitted); Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d
1334, 1356 n.29 (10th Cir.) ('Before a death penalty can be imposed it must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] killed or attempted to kill the victim or himself intended or
contemplated that the victim's life would be taken.") (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1090 (1984); Reddix v. Thigpen, 728 F.2d 705, 708 (5th Cir.) ("The eighth amendment,
... allows the state to impose the death penalty only if it first proves that the defendant either
participated directly in the killing or personally had an intent to commit murder"), reh'g denied, 732
F.2d 494 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
158
 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.
159
 The petitioners in Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987), for example, were "aware of no
federal case allowing a death sentence to stand solely on the basis that a defendant anticipated that
lethal force might be used or that lives might be taken." Brief for Petitioners at 26 (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
1 °0 See, e.g., People v. Garewal, 173 Cal. App. 3d 285, 297, 218 Cal. Rptr. 690, 695-96 (1985)
(death penalty may be imposed only if the aider and abettor shared the perpetrator's intent to kill)
(citing Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 151, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1984));
Jackson v. State, 502 So.2d 409, 413 (Fla. 1986) (for jury to recommend death sentence, it must
first find that defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill); State v. Peterson, 287 S.C.
244, 248, 335 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1985) ("death penalty can not be imposed on an individual who
aids and abets in a crime in the course of which a murder is committed by others, but who did not
himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that killing take place or that lethal force be used").
161
 For example, see infra note 224 and accompanying text for the Enmund based challenges of
Arizona death sentences.
162
 See, e.g., Jones v. Thigpen, 555 F. Supp. 870, 877 (S.D. Miss. 1983) (no evidence that
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II. TISON V. ARIZONA
A. Majority Opinion
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held in Tison v. Arizona that, if a
nontriggerperson substantially participates in a felony and shows reckless indifference
to human life, then a state may impose death on him or her without running afoul of
the eighth amendment. 165 The Court, finding that the Arizona courts already had estab-
lished that Ricky and Raymond Tison were major participants in the felony murder, 164
vacated the judgments and remanded the case to the Arizona Supreme Court to deter-
mine if the Tisons showed reckless indifference to human life. 10 The Arizona Supreme
Court vacated the Tisons' death sentences and remanded the case to the Arizona trial
court; the Yuma County Superior Court of Arizona made the finding required by Tison
and resentenced Ricky and Raymond Tison to death on November 20, 1987.' 66
The Tison Court looked to several factors in enunciating a substantial participation
and reckless indifference standard. First, the Court concluded that the Tison brothers'
actions fell between the two extremes to which Enmund spoke: the minor participant in
a felony who has no intent to kill and the major felony participant who, intending to
kill, does. 107 After factually distinguishing Enmund, the Court surveyed state legislative
and judicial responses to capital sentencing and determined that public sentiment, as
measured in the legislature and judiciary, supported a requirement of intent to kill prior
to imposing the death penalty. 166 Finally, the Court compared reckless indifference with
intent and found that an intent standard did not necessarily identify those criminals
more deserving of the death penalty.'"
The Tison Court began its analysis by juxtaposing the facts of the Tisons' case with
the intent standard set out in Enmund. Enmund, the Court reasoned, spoke to two
extremes: the minor participant in an armed robbery, away from the scene of the crime,
who neither intended to kill nor had any murderous culpability; and the felony murderer
who killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.' 70 In the case of the former actor, the
defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill the victim); State v. Emery, 141 Ariz, 549,
553, 688 P.2d 175, 179 (1984) (because record did not support finding that defendant killed victim,
attempted to kill victim, or intended that his accomplice kill the victim, his capital sentence was
reduced to life imprisonment).
L63 Tison V. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1688 (1987).
164 Id. The Arizona Supreme Court in Arizona v. Ricky Wayne Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 545, 633
P.2d 335, 354 (1981), quoted the trial court's finding which was that:
[n]either defendant's participation was relatively minor .... (T]he participation of
each in the crimes giving rise to the application of the felony murder rule in this case
was very substantial .. At the moment of the firing, their participation may not have
equalled that of Randy Greenawalt or Gary Tison, but their standing and watching
them (sic] while armed themselves cannot be characterized as relatively minor partic-
ipation.
And in Arizona v. Ricky Wayne Tison, 142 Ariz. 446, 690 P.2d 747, 749, the Arizona Supreme
Court concluded that Ricky Tison "played an active part in the events that led to the murders."
163 non, 107 S. Ct. at 1688.
' 66 Telephone interview with Kathy Kempley, Deputy Clerk, Arizona Supreme Court ( Jan. 11,
1988).
161 non, 107 S. Ct. at 1684.
168 Id. at 1685-86.
' 66 /d. at 1687-88.
In Id. at 1684.
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Court stated, capital punishment was a disproportionate penalty; for the latter, the death
penalty was constitutionally valid."' The facts of the Tisons' case fell in between these
two extremes. 172
 Thus, the Tison Court stated that Enmund did not address the precise
issue presented in Tison v. Arizona — whether the eighth amendment precluded the
imposition of the death penalty where the defendant substantially participated in the
felony and possessed a recklessly indifferent state of mind."s The Tison Court concluded
that this new constitutional question required a judicial response. 14
The Than Court relied in part on state legislation in making its determination.'"
The majority surveyed the states that permit capital punishment and found that twenty-
one jurisdictions authorized the death penalty where the defendant was a major actor
in a felony in which he knew death was highly likely to occur even though the defendant
did not intend to kill.'" These statistics led the Court to conclude that society does not
wholly reject capital punishment as excessive for a felony murderer who did not intend
to kill,'"
The Mon Court also considered state court sentencing in making its ruling.'" The
Court cited five cases to support its determination that an "apparent consensus" existed
171 Id.
' 72 Id.
173 Id. at 1685.
' 74 Id.
175 Id.; see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (current judgment of state legislatures
weighs heavily on side of rejecting death penalty as punishment for rape of adult woman); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (society's endorsement of death penalty best indicated by the
post-Furman legislative response).
' 7 ' Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1685-86. The majority categorized the 21 jurisdictions in the following
manner:
1) Four states permit capital punishment in felony murder cases upon a showing of state of
mind less than intent to kill such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human life. Id. at 1685
& n.5 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1501(1)(a)(1977 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I I, § 636
(a)(2), (b) (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 38, 'A 9-1(a)(3), 9-1(b)(6) (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507.020(1)(6) (1984)).
2) Two jurisdictions require that the defendant substantially participate in the felony. Id. at
1685 & n.6 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1473 (c)(6)(D) (1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(4) (1985)).
3) At least six states consider minor participation in the felony as a mitigating factor. Id. at
1685 & n.7 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(3) (1978 and Supp. 1986); Coco. REV. STAT.
§ 16-I I-103(5)(d) (1978 and Supp. 1985); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(c)(4) (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-304(6) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(e) (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. 15A-
2000(f )(4) (1983)).
4) Six states permit capital punishment for felony murder simplieiler. Id. at 1685-86 & n.8
(citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2(a)(17) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04(1)(a),
775.082(I), 921.141(5)(d) (1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16 -5 - 1(a), 17-10.30(6)(2) (1982, 1984); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16.3-10, 16-3-20(C)(a)(1) (1985 and Supp. 1986); TENN. Cone ANN. §§ 39-2-202(a),
39-2-204(i)(7) (1982); Wvo. STAT. §§ 6-2-101, 6-2-102(h)(iv) (1983)).
5) Three states require some additional aggravating factor before imposing the death penalty.
Id. at 1686 & n.9 (citing IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g) (Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12
(1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (Supp. 1986)).
177 107 S. Ct. at 1686. The Tison Court concluded that "[t]his substantial and recent legislative
authorization of the death penalty for the crime of felony murder regardless of the absence of a
finding of an intent to kill powerfully suggests that our society does not reject the death penalty as
grossly excessive under these circumstances." Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, jj.); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 (1977)
(emphasis in original)).
Po Id.; cf. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 (sentencing decisions of juries are important in determining
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supportingt75 the proposition that major participation in a felony likely to result in the
loss of human life, without a finding that the defendant intended to kill, may suffice to
warrant death)" The Court stated that these state decisions indicated that there was no
overriding state policy against the imposition of the death penalty in cases like Tison. 48 '
In the third component of their analysis, the Tison Court compared the two standards
— reckless indifference and intent to kill — to determine which, if either, typified the
more blameworthy killer. The Tison Court declared that a defendant's mental - state played
a critical role in the determination of his or her culpability in capital cases) 82 The Court
explained that, historically, the more purposeful the criminal conduct, the more serious
the offense, and thus, the more severely the conduct should be punished)" The Court
cautioned against focusing solely on the issue of "intent," however, for such a narrow
concentration did not necessarily yield the most dangerous and culpable killers." In
addition, the Court noted that many persons who intended to and did kill suffered no
criminal liability, or if they did receive punishment, did not deserve the death penalty)"
By contrast, the Court commented, nonintentional killers may be the most ruthless and
dangerous of all, 1 '° Thus, the Court concluded that reckless indifference may he equally
as shocking to society's morality as an intent to kill.'" As a result, the Court noted,
common law and criminal codes had classified the two behaviors together.' 88 Conse-
quently, the Court stated that a reckless disregard for human life represented a highly
whether capital punishment is appropriate); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 ("jury also is significant and
reliable objective index of contemporary values") (citing Furman v, Georgia, 408 U.S. at 439-40
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1686-87 (citing Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 84, 656 S.W.2d 684, 687
(1983) (forced nighttime rubbery with guns, killing contemplated), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984);
Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 586, 599 (Del. 1985) (defendant present at robbery and murders,
but conflicting evidence as to defendant's participation in killing), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1589 (1987);
Ruffin v. State, 420 So.2d 591, 594 (Fla. 1982) (defendant present at murder, assisted co-defendant
in kidnapping victim, raped victim, did not interfere with killing, and continued on venture) (citing
trial court); People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 52, 447 N.E.2d 353, 378 (defendant present at scene, had
participated in other previous crimes with triggerman clueing which triggermari killed under similar
circumstances), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001-02 (1983); Selvage v. State, 680 S.W.2d 17, 19, 22 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984) (defendant robbed jewelry store while a store security guard was killed, but no
direct evidence that defendant shot victim)).
"" Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1686,
I"' See id.
188 Id. at 1687.
188 Id. The Court cited several examples to support this contention. The Court noted that
"Pennsylvania became the first American jurisdiction to distinguish between degrees of murder,
reserving capital punishment to 'wilful, deliberate and premeditated' killings and felony murders."
hi. The Court also referred to Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), in which the plurality articulated
the principle that the defendant's mental state was essential to weighing defendant's criminal liability
in capital sentencing cases. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1687. Finally, the Tison Court noted that Ertmund
also recognized the importance of the mental state, ruling the death penalty impermissible where
the defendant is a minor actor with no culpable state but valid where the felony murderer intended
to kill. Id.
184 Than, 1(17 S. Ct. at 1687.
185 Id. at 1687-88.
186 1d. at 1688.
187 Id.
188 Id. (citing G. FLE'rcnEtt, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.5 pp. 447-48 (1978); Mom. PENAL
CODE § 21(1.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (murder includes criminal homicide when "committed
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.")).
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culpable mental state that could be considered when making a death penalty determi-
nation.'"
The Tison Court did not attempt to delineate the different types of actions or states
of mind sufficient to justify imposing the death penalty. 199 Rather, the Court held that
major participation in a felony and reckless indifference to human life satisfied the
culpability standard of Enmund.°' The Court did not apply this standard to the Tison
facts, although it did suggest that the brothers manifested the requisite mental state.' 92
Because the Arizona courts had not established whether or not the Tison brothers' acted
with reckless indifference to human life, the Supreme Court vacated the Tisons' death
sentence and remanded their case to the Arizona Supreme Court for a determination
of that issue. 193 The Arizona trial court has since resentenced the Tisons to death on
each of the murders. 194 The brothers' sentences are currently on appeal to the Arizona
Supreme Court.'"
. B. The Tison Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan attacked the majority's substantial partic-
ipation and reckless indifference standard, claiming it lacked substantive support and
had problematic consequences. First, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's
intimation that the record supported the conclusion that the Tisons showed reckless
indifference to human life.' 96 Second, Justice Brennan suggested that precedent, legis-
lative and sentencing trends, and principles of proportionality demonstrated the death
penalty's inappropriateness to such defendants as the Tison brothers. 197 Finally, the
Court's holding, claimed Justice Brennan, exacerbated the problems already plaguing
capital sentencing, including the arbitrariness of distinguishing those for whom death is
a permissible penalty from those for whom it is not. 193
Justice Brennan first reasoned that, contrary to the majority's suggestions, the record
failed to support the claim that the Tisons acted with reckless disregard for human
Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1688. The majority declared that:
reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities
known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental
state that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when
that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result.
Id.
' 9° Id. ("We will not attempt to precisely delineate the particular types of conduct and states of
mind warranting imposition of the death penalty here.").
191 Id.
102 Id. While not ruling specifically on the issue of reckless indifference, the majority, in dictum,
indicated that such a standard could be met if applied to the facts of Tison. On one occasion, the
Court stated that "the record would support a finding of the culpable mental state of reckless
indifference to human life." Id, at 1684. And on another, "[t]hese facts.., would clearly support a
finding that [Ricky and Raymond Tison] both subjectively appreciated that their acts were likely to
result in the taking of innocent life." Id. at 1685.
191 Id. at 1688.
194 Telephone interview with Kathy Kempley, Deputy Clerk, Arizona Supreme Court ( Jan. I I,
1988).
' 9' Id.
' 96 Id. at 1691 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 97 See generally id. at 1693-1701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 98 1d. at 1702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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life. 199 He based this contention on the fact that the brothers had a different mental
state at the time of the prison breakout than at the time of the murders. 200 Although
the fact that the Tisons participated in the breakout and escape may have indicated that
they contemplated and anticipated the use of lethal force during that time, according to
Justice Brennan, such participation did not support the Court's suggestions about the
Tisons' mental states at the time of the killings."'
Justice Brennan next argued that, even if the record did support a finding that the
Tisons acted with reckless indifference during the robbery and kidnapping, the majority
improperly restricted its focus to the facts the Arizona Supreme Court offered. 202 Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, the record contained other relevant evidence the majority
ignored.203 This other evidence included the fact that the Tison brothers were getting
water for the family when the shootings occurred and that, though neither could have
prevented the murders, both brothers felt helpless, surprised, and remorseful over the
deaths."' Justice Brennan argued that, by selectively concentrating on certain evidence,
the majority failed to afford the defendants a reliable and individualized ruling under
Enmund. 205 The only way to secure such a ruling, according to Justice Brennan, was to
hold a full evidentiary hearing before a trial court. 206 Therefore, justice Brennan argued
that because the lower courts did not resolve the issue of recklessness, a trial court should
decide the issue following a complete evidentiary hearing. 207 Contrary to the majority's
disposition of Tison, Justice Brennan's dissent suggested that on remand, the hearing
should consider a full review of the record and not just those components the majority
emphasized."8
Justice Brennan next addressed the two rationales offered by the majority for
disposing with the Enmund intent requirement. According to Justice Brennan, the ma-
jority had reasoned that those who intentionally killed were not always the most culpable
and dangerous of murderers. 208 The Court also claimed, stated Justice Brennan, that
state legislatures and courts had indicated a willingness to impose the death penalty
where a defendant's mental state did not rise to the level of intent to ki11. 210 Justice
Brennan disputed both points.
' 99 Id. at 1691 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2°0 Id. at 1691 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1692 (Brennan, J., dissenting).:
207
204 Id. Other factors, Justice Brennan noted, that the majority neglected included; neither Ricky
nor Raymond had a prior felony record; birth sons lived with their mother; neither planned the
escape and both conditioned their involvement in the escape on their father's promise that no one
was to be injured. See Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1693 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed
out that "[Oven these circumstances, the sons' own testimony that they were surprised by the
killings, and did not expect them to occur, appears more plausible than the Court's speculation that
they 'subjectively appreciated that their activities were likely to result in the taking of innocent life.'"
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion).
200
	 id. at 1693 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200 Id, (citing Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 701 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 708-09 (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
2°7 Id.
"8 See id.
"9 Id. at 1694 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2I0 Id. at 1694, 1696-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the majority's opinion on intent and state sentencing trends.
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Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that, in some circumstances, the most
culpable murderers killed without ever intending to do so. 2 " Yet where a murderer
neither killed nor intended to kill, Justice Brennan stated, he or she is not as culpable. 212
Moreover, a finding of intent differed qualitatively from a finding of reckless indiffer-
ence.213 Because of that distinction, Justice Brennan reasoned, the moral and criminal
culpabilities of one who killed or intended to kill did not correspond to those of one
who did not kill or intend to ki11. 214 This distinction in culpabilities, Justice Brennan
concluded, manifested itself in Enmund's holding, which he interpreted as constitutionally
mandating that a sentencer must find that a nontriggerperson had an intent to kill, prior
to imposing the death penalty on him or her. 215 Brennan also expressed reservations
about the apparent inconsistency between Tison and the decisions subsequent to Enmund
that held that a state must establish that a defendant intended to kill before sentencing
such a defendant to death.2 '6
Justice Brennan disputed the majority's claim that a majority of American jurisdic-
tions would authorize the death penalty in such situations as the Tisons'. 212 Justice
Brennan performed his own survey of state statutes, concentrating on those that pro-
hibited the death penalty, 218 those that required a finding that the defendant killed or
intended to kill,21 ' and those that prohibited capital punishment under the Tison stan-
2" Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1694 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212 Id.
" Id. at 1695 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan explains the distinction in the following
manner: "The difference lies in the nature of the choice each has made. The reckless actor has not
chosen to bring about the killing in the way the intentional actor has." Id. (emphasis in original).
214 Id. Brennan supported this claim by first laying down the premise that differentiating
between mental states is based on the person's ability to choose between good and evil. Id. (quoting
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)). From this, Brennan explained, followed the
argument that punishment must conform to the choice the individual makes. Id. So, Brennan
concluded, reckless indifference should yield a different penalty than an intentional killing "if we
are to retain 'the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability' on which criminal justice
depends." Id. (quoting People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rpm
442, 446 (1965)).
Brennan then moved to a brief survey of prior cases to illustrate that distinguishing intent
from reckless indifference is especially important for felony murder cases. Id. He noted that in
Lockett, Justice White had previously commented directly on this issue when he said: Isjociety has
made a judgment, which has deep roots in the history of the criminal law ... distinguishing at least
for the purpose of the imposition of the death penalty between the culpability of those who acted
with and those who acted withotda purpose to destroy life." Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1695 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 626-28 (1978)). Justice Brennan also cited the
Enmund Court for recognizing that "American criminal law has long considered a defendant's
intention — and therefore his For her] moral guilt — to be critical to the 'degree of [his or her]
criminal culpability.'" Id. at 1696 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800 (citation
omitted)).
215 Id.
2 ' 6 See id. (quoting Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 697 (1986)).
217 Id. at 1697 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218 1d. According to Justice Brennan, thirteen states and the District of Columbia had abolished
the death penalty at the time of the nun decision. Id. at 1697 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
NAACP LEGAL. DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. (Aug. 1986)).
719 Id. at 1697. For states requiring a finding of actual and intentional killing, see id. at 1697
n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 565.001, 565.003, 565.020 (1986) (death
penalty to those who intentionally, knowingly, and deliberately cause death); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 2502(a), (b), (d), 1102 (1982) (death penalty only for intentional killers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
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dard.2" Justice Brennan calculated that approximately sixty percent of American juris-
dictions disagreed with the majority's substantial participation and reckless indifference
standard. 221
Justice Brennan also faulted the majority for focusing on those jurisdictions whose
statutes authorize sentencers to impose the death penalty on defendants who have not
intended to kill, while ignoring the limited number of instances that those jurisdictions
in fact imposed the sentence under those circumstances. 222 Had the majority examined
the number of executions since Enmund, Justice Brennan explained, the Court would
have found that all of the sixty-five people executed had killed, attempted to kill, or
intended to ki11. 223 Furthermore, of the sixty-four death row inmates in Arizona, the
§§ 2303(b), (c) (Supp. 1986) (only murderers of correctional officers may receive the death penalty);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.030, 10.95.020 (1985) (death reserved for only those who kill with
premeditation and at least one aggravating circumstance)). The dissent also pointed out two other
states that would not impose the death penalty under the majority's standard, although, for other
reasons, might impose death on the facts of Than. Id. (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 0 410, 412(b),
413(d)(10), 413(e)(1), 413(d)(5) (1957 & Supp. 1986) (death reserved for person committing killing
with possible exception if victim is a child); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 630:1, 630:1(111), 630:1.
a(11)(b)(2) (1986) (death reserved for killing law enforcement officer, murder for hire and killing
during a kidnapping)).
220 107 S. Ct. at 1697 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For those state statutes that prohibit the
death penalty under the Than standard, see id. at 1686 n.10 (citing ALA. CODE §§ 13A-2-23, 13A-
5-40(a)(2), (b), 15A-5-51, 13A-6-2(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986); LA. REV. SLAT. ANN. § 14:30(A)(1)
(West 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(7) (Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.030(1)(b),
200.030(4), 200.033(4)(a)-(b) (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 1 1-3a(a), (c) (West Supp. 1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2-1(A)(2), 31-20A-5 (1984); Onto REv. CODE ANN. $§ 2903.01(B)-(D),
2929.02(A), 2929.04(A)(7) (Anderson 1982); OR. REV. STAT. I63.095(d), 163.115(1)(b) (1985);
TEX. PENAL. CODE ANN. H 19.02(a), 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974 & Stipp, 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76.5-202(1) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Supp. 1986)).
Justice Brennan also cited to two other states that rejected the death penalty where the
defendant substantially participated in a felony and manifested an extreme indifference to human
life. Id. (citing Mo. ANN. CODE art, 27, H 410, 412(b), 413(d)(10), 413(e)(1), 413(d)(5) (1957 & Supp.
1986) (death penalty reserved for actual killer with potential exception if victim is a child); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. H 630:1, 630:1(111), 630:1-a(1)(b)(2) (1986) (killing a law enforcement official,
murder for hire, and killing during a kidnapping are the only crimes warranting death penalty)).
221 /d. "Thus it appears that about three-fifths of the States and the District of Columbia have
rejected the position the Court adopts today." Id.
222 Id. at 1697. As for the "handful of state cases" that the majority relies upon to help support
its holding, id. at 1696, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, cautioned against overemphasizing their
importance. According to Justice Brennan, those cases differed from Tison in that the courts there
intimated that the defendants participated in the killing, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Id.
at 1696 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 84, 656 S.W.2d 684, 687
(1983) (appellants discussed necessity of murder), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Deputy v. State,
500 A.2d 581, 599 (Del. 1985) (appellant present and involved in murders), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1589 (1987); Ruffin v. State, 420 So,2d 591, 594 (Fla. 1982) (evidence clear that appellant jointly
participated in premeditated killing); People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 52-53, 447 N.E.2d 353, 378-79
(1983) (defendant participated in several burglaries in all of which colelon murdered victim);
Selvage v. State, 680 S.W.2d 17, 22 (Tex. Grim. App. 1984) (appellant used lethal force to effectuate
escape and attempted to kill others)).
222 See id. at 1698 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796). Justice Brennan
noted that of the sixty-five, in only two was there some doubt as to whether the defendant actually
murdered the victim; but in both cases, the defendant was found to have intended the deaths. Id.
at 1698 n.16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Green v. Zant, 738 F.2d 1529, 1533-34 (11th Cir.)
(case was presented to jury on malice-murder rather than felony murder theory, and evidence
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Arizona Supreme Court found that all who unsuccessfully challenged their capital sen-
tences based on Enntund had killed or intended to kill.224 The statistics, suggested Justice
Brennan, conveyed a clear message: the Tison sentence was an aberration within Arizona
and the United States. 225 Moreover, Justice Brennan argued that the Court's reliance on
roughly twenty states was an inadequate substitute for a proper proportionality analysis
and lacked sufficient persuasive force to deviate from the Enmurid holding.226
Justice Brennan continued by charging that the Court's opinion did not coincide
with the traditional concept of proportionality, which held that a punishment should not
exceed a crime's severity or a defendant's own actions and culpability. 227 Justice Brennan
also pointed out the majority holding's inconsistency with proportionality principles laid
out in recent Supreme Court cases, an inconsistency derived from a failure to examine
the full evidentiary record. 228 Had the majority conducted a proper proportionality
supported verdict on that theory), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098 (1984); Skillern v. Estelle, 720 F.2d
839, 844 (5th Cir. 1983) (evidence supports finding that Skillern agreed and "plotted in advance"
to kill the eventual victim), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1067 (1984)).
224 Id. at 1698-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For the cases in which the Arizona Supreme Court
has rejected an Enmund challenge, see State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 477-78, 715 P.2d 721, 730-
31 (1986) (defendant intended to kill victims); State v. Hooper, 145 Ariz. 538, 551, 703 P.2d 482,
495 (1985) (defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073
(1986); State v. Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. 441, 449-50, 702 P.2d 670, 678-79 (1985) (defendant
actively and deliberately participated in killing and intended to kill victim), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
975 (1985); State v. Bishop, 144 Ariz. 521, 521 n.2, 698 P.2d 1240, 1240 11.2 (1985) (facts demon-
strate intent to kill within meaning of Enmund); State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 403, 698 P.2d 183,
198 (1985) (defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill), aff'd, 476 U.S. 147, 157 (1986);
State v. Villafuerte, 142 Ariz. 323, 331, 690 P.2d 42, 50 (1984) (defendant killed, attempted to kill,
or intended to kill), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985); State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 253, 686 P.2d
'750, 776 (defendant killed victim), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1066 (1984); State v. Harding, 141 Ariz.
492, 501, 687 P.2d 1247, 1256 (1984) (defendant killed victim); State v. James, 141 Ariz. 141, 148,
685 P.2d 1293, 1300 (defendant killed and intended to kill), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); State
v. Libberton, 141 Ariz. 132, 137, 685 P.2d 1284, 1289 (1984) (defendant intended to kill victim);
State v. Smith, 138 Ariz. 79, 85, 673 P.2d 17, 23 (1983) (defendant participated in killing and
intended to kill), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074 (1984); State v. Jordan, 137 Ariz. 504, 507, 672 P.2d
169, 172 (1983) (defendant killed and intended to kill victim); State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312,
318, 666 P.2d 57, 63 (defendant intended to kill victim), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983); State v.
McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 200, 665 P.2d 70, 82 (1983) (defendant killed victim); State v. Gillies, 135
Ariz. 500, 515, 662 P.2d 1007, 1022 (1983) (defendant's participation in the murder was substantial
and intentional), aff'd, 142 Ariz. 564, 691 P.2d 655 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985).
223 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1699 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
226
 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1699 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the results of
the Enmund challenges in Arizona were clear:
Thus, like Enmund, the Tisons' sentence appears to be an aberration within Arizona
itself as well as nationally and internationally. The Court's objective evidence that the
statutes of roughly 20 States appear to authorize the death penalty for defendants in
the Court's new category is therefore an inadequate substitute for a proper propor-
tionality analysis, and is not persuasive evidence that the punishment that was uncon-
stitutional for Enmund is constitutional for the Tisons.
Id.
227 Id. at 1700 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote that one of the eighth amend-
ment's limiting principles is that "States may not impose punishment that is disproportionate to the
severity of the offense or to the individual's own conduct and culpability." Id.
228 Id. at 1699 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan cited three Supreme Court decisions as
illustrative of the proportionality principles. Id. In Enmund v. Arizona, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982),
the Court stated that "the focus [of the constitutional inquiry) must be on [Enmund's) culpability,
not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims ...."
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inquiry, Justice Brennan claimed, the Court would have found the Tison case factually
similar to Enmund. 229 The majority failed to do so, however, and for that reason, justice
Brennan stated the Mon holding could not be reconciled with prior cases. 239
Justice Brennan's final remarks, and those in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens
did not join, concerned the implications of the majority's decision. Based on the infre-
quency of death sentences for those who did not kill or intend to ki11, 23 ' Justice Brennan
warned that the Tison holding could conceivably reawaken concerns the Court had
expressed about capital sentencing fifteen years earlier in Furman v. Georgia; the Court
still had not achieved a system capable of distinguishing those individuals who deserved
the death penalty from those who did not.232 Decisions like the majority's, Justice Bren-
nan contended, that did not attempt to delineate behavior worthy of capital punishment,
combined with such doctrines as felony murder, which allowed excessive discretion in
determining criminal culpability, illustrated that the Court had not yet issued guidelines
that ensured that capital punishment determinations complied with the eighth amend-
ment's principles. 2" Such discretion lent itself to arbitrary rulings which, in turn, illus-
trated that capital sentencing still did not comport with the eighth amendment. 234
III. THE TISON REASONING: AN UNSUBSTANTIATED ANALYSIS
The Tison Court created a new standard for determining when the state may validly
impose a capital sentence on a defendant. Under Tison, capital punishment does not
offend the eighth amendment where the individual substantially participated in a felony
In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977), the Court undertook a comparison of the crimes
of rape and murder to determine that death was a disproportionate punishment for rape. Justice
White, writing for a plurality, said that "in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person
and to the public, [rape] does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking
of human life." Coker, 433 U.S. at 598.
Finally, in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279 (1983), the Court was faced with whether the
eighth amendment prohibits life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a seventh
nonviolent felony. In holding that the punishment was not constitutionally allowable because it was
disproportionate to the offense committed, id. at 303, Justice Powell approached the constitutional
question by stating: "In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should
be guided by objective criteria including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id. at 292.
22i See Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1701 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed out that
those similarities included the following: neither the Tisons nor Earl Enmund killed, attempted to
kill or intended to kill anyone; and both the Tisons and Earl Enmund received capital sentences
for their accomplices' intentional acts which they could not control. Id.
na Id.
231 Id. Justice Brennan stated: "Islo rarely does any State (let alone any Western country other
than our own) ever execute a person who neither killed nor intended to kill that 'these death
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.'"
Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1701 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309
(1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
232 Id. at 1701 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Mills case thus demonstrates ... that we have yet to
achieve a system capable of 'distinguishing the few cases in which the [death penalty] is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not.'") (quoting Furman v, Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972)
(White, J., concurring)).
233 Id. at 1702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"4 Id,
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and manifested an extreme indifference to human life. 235
 Upon closer examination,
though, the reasoning used to reach the Tison decision lacks judicial soundness. When
analyzed in light of available precedent, Tison represents a major departure from
Enmund236
 and the proportionality principle. 252
 Furthermore, public sentiment, as mea-
sured through legislative enactments and sentencing decisions,239
 rejects death as a
sanction where a defendant did not kill or intend to kill. Finally, application of the non
standard, by its inherently amorphous nature, will yield unpredictable results and will
lead to the same arbitrary capital sentencing that the Supreme Court has held to violate
the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual prohibition. 24° For the states to administer
the death penalty so as not to run afoul of the Constitution, the Court should abandon
the Than standard and return to the intent requirement that Enmund promulgated.
A. Departure from Precedent
Enmund v. Florida marked the first case in which the Supreme Court addressed and
ruled as a cohesive body on the issue of the death penalty and the nontriggerperson
defendant charged with felony murder.2" Enmund's holding is relatively clear: the eighth
amendment precludes executing one who has not killed, attempted to kill, or intended
to ki11. 242 The Than Court unnecessarily departed from this precedent; the facts in non
are sufficiently similar to those in Enmund to warrant a similar result.
Two important facts stand out in Enmund. First, the Court acknowledged the Florida
Supreme Court's finding that, as the getaway driver, Earl Enmund aided and abetted
the commission of a felony. 243
 Second, and more importantly, the Court declared that
Enmund did not intend to commit or facilitate the commission of a murder. 2" Because
Enmund did not intend to take a life, the Supreme Court held that Florida could not
sentence him to death. 243
On these two points, the Tisons' case is indistinguishable. Although Ricky and
Raymond Tison actively participated in the felonies of armed robbery and escape from
prison, and may have contemplated the use of lethal force during the breakout, 246
 they
did not possess the same state of mind after stealing the Lyons' automobile. For the
Tison brothers, the getaway car's malfunctioning and the. subsequent armed robbery,
kidnapping, and murder all represented unexpected events. Thus, the Arizona and
255
 Id. at 1688.
236 See infra notes 241-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Tim majority's
departure from precedent.
2" See infra notes 259-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proportionality
principle.
238 See infra notes 283-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislature, the death
penalty and felony murder.
259 See infra notes 298-318 and accompanying text for a discussion of sentencing, the death
penalty, and felony murder.
240 See infra notes 319-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the consequences of Mon.
2" 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
242 1d. at 797.
243
	 id. at 788.
244
	 at 798.
245 Id. at 797.
2" See Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1691 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Brief for Respondents at
4, State v. Ricky Wayne Tison, 142 Ariz. 446, 690 P.2d 747 (1984); State v. Raymond Curtis Tison,
142 Ariz. 454, 690 P.2d 755 (1984) (No. 84-6075).
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United States Supreme Courts both made significant findings: neither Ricky nor Ray-
mond Tison killed the Lyons family, and neither Ricky nor Raymond intended, antici-
pated, or desired in any way to facilitate the victims' deaths. 247 Several facts buttressed
these determinations: the Tisons conditioned their participation in the escape on their
father's promise that no one would be injured, the brothers retrieved water for the
family prior to the murders, and the Tisons felt remorse over the killings. 249
The Tison brothers and Earl Enmund stood, therefore, on basically equal ground;
none intended the killings to occur, but their respective states sentenced them to death
for the intentional acts of others. The Supreme Court vacated Enmund's sentence
because he did not possess the requisite intent to kill. The facts of Tison were sufficiently
similar to justify the same result. Nonetheless, the Court reached different conclusions
in the two cases.
Not only did the Tison majority fail to hold that Enmund governtki its facts, but the
Court also contradicted its own later applications of the Enmund standard. Justice White,
writing for the majority in the 1986 case of Cabana v. Bullock,"g asserted that Enmund
imposed a categorical rule prohibiting the state from executing the class of criminals
who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill. 250 Thus, the Than Court, in holding
that a state need not require that a defendant intend to kill before imposing the death
penalty on him or her, conflicts directly with Cabana.
The Tison holding also deviates from the Court's landmark holdings in Gregg v.
Georgia, 25 I and Coker v. Georgia, 237 which established the principle that punishment must
measurably contribute to accepted penological goals to be valid.2" For the Tison decision
to be consistent with this principle, death must further the retributive or deterrent goals
of capital punishment when applied to the recklessly indifferent felon. Upon closer
examination, death does not advance either of' the two ends in such circumstances.
Underlying the retributive goal of any punishment is the notion that the level of
punishment should directly relate to the criminal's personal culpability. 254 An analysis of
247 The Arizona Supreme Court, prior to the 1982 Enmund decision, found "that the Tisons]
did not specifically intend that the Lyonses and Theresa Tyson die, that they did not plot in advance
that these homicides take place, or that they did not actually pull the triggers on the guns which
inflicted the fatal wounds ...." State v. Ricky Wayne Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 545, 633 P.2d 335, 354
(1981) (emphasis added). In the Tisons' appeal after Entnund, the Arizona Supreme Court seemingly
ignored this finding, instead craftily interpreting intent to include those situations where the
defendant could foresee the possibility of bloodshed. See supra note 51 for a discussion of the
Arizona Supreme Court's interpretation.
The United States Supreme Court agreed with petitioners that "there [was] no evidence that
either Ricky or Raymond Tison took any act which he desired to, or was substantially certain would,
cause death." Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1684.
24I4 See supra notes 21, 27, and 32 and accompanying text for a discussion of these mitigating
factors.
249 106 S. Ct. 689 (1986).
2" Id. at 696. To resolve any doubt as to the import of Enmund, J ustice  White made the following
statement in the Cabana majority opinion: "Enmund • . imposes a categorical rule: a person who
has not in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be
used may not be sentenced to death. Nonetheless, the rule remains a substantial limitation on
sentencing ... ." Id. at 697.
251 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
557 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
252
	 at 592.
754 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1683.
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the two mental states with which the Tisan Court wrestled — reckless indifference and
intent — reveals a difference in the conscious objects of the intentional actor and the
recklessly indifferent actor. The intentional actor chooses to bring about results differ-
ently than the recklessly indifferent actor. 255 This distinction suggests that the actors
have different culpabilities and different levels of moral responsibility. Thus, their pun-
ishments should differ. 256 The finality of death underscores the importance of reserving
it for the most culpable of criminals.257 Thus, where death is the sanction involved, the
recklessly indifferent felon deserves a different punishment than the intentional killer.
Capital punishment's second function is to deter individuals from participating in
an activity to which they know a certain sanction will attach. In Enmund, the majority
rejected the contention that death would measurably deter one who has no intention or
purpose to take another's life 2 58 Nothing in the Tison majority opinion suggests that the
likelihood of a capital sentence will deter defendants who lack the intent to kill, but
possess a reckless indifference for human life. Like Earl Enmund, Ricky and Raymond
Tison probably would not have been deterred from participating in the inherently
dangerous felonies of armed escape and robbery because they did not intend to facilitate
or participate in the homicides that accompanied such crimes. Moreover, the Tison
standard fails to deter the recklessly indifferent actor because "reckless indifference to
human life" is an inherently vague phrase. Predicting which fact situations satisfy the
standard becomes a futile task. As a result, one cannot appreciate the punishment
resulting from a certain act, and refrain from that act, if one cannot comprehend the
state of mind warranting the punishment.
Thus, the Tison ruling departs from precedent in two respects. First, the facts of
Than are so closely analogous to those in Enmund that the Enmund decision should
govern. Moreover, Tison contradicts Cabana, in which the Court declared that sentencers
must find an intent to kill prior to imposing the death penalty. Second, the Tison
punishment does not further either of the two judicially recognized goals of capital
punishment, retribution or deterrence.
B. A Departure from the Proportionality Principle
The Court has recognized that the eighth amendment embodies the principle that
punishment must be proportional to the crime. 2" In cases where punishment is dispro-
portional, the Court has invalidated the sanction.m A proportionality analysis involves
255 Id. at 1695 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 213 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the difference between the two states of mind.
256 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,798 (1982) ("causing harm intentionally must be punished
more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally") (quoting H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 162 (1968)).
257 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1695 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-99.
259 In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,303 (1983), the Court declared unconstitutional a statute
proscribing a life sentence without the possibility of parole after a seventh nonviolent felony. The
Court did so through the proportionality principle which it found to be "deeply rooted and
frequently in common law jurisprudence." Id. at 284. The Court also commented that the eighth
amendment adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights which was meant to include "the
right to be free from excessive punishments." Id. at 285-86.
213° See, e.g., Salem, 463 U.S. at 287 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,667 (1962) (90
day sentence excessive for crime of narcotic addiction)); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,796-97
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two determinations. First, the Court determines whether the punishment exceeds the
crime for which it is imposed."' Second, the Court examines the mental state and the
criminal culpability of the actor, and attempts to discover if a nexus exists between the
two.262 Reviewing the Tison holding in light of these two elements, Tison clearly conflicts
with the proportionality principle.
Death is a unique sanction, 203 reserved For the most extreme crimes."' Rape, albeit
a serious offense, does not fit into this select group of crimes. 265 Not until Enmund did
the Court clearly define the constitutional confines of the capital sentence. Only in cases
where the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or, intended to kill will the Court hold that
the death penalty is proportional to the crime and thus consistent with the eighth
amendment.266
The Tisons' situation was similar to Earl Enmund's in several important respects.
As the Florida Supreme Court did in Enmund, Arizona convicted Ricky and Raymond
under its felony murder statute." , Both the Arizona Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court concluded that, like Earl Enmund, the Tisons did not intend
anyone's deaths even though the Tisons actively participated in an armed robbery and
kidnapping from which the deaths resulted. 268 By definition, the crimes of armed
robbery209 and kidnapping do not involve death to the victim. 2b0 If one examines the
Tisons' actions and states of mind, and not the triggerperson's, it is apparent that Than
does not fall within that category of crimes for which, according to Enmund, death is an
acceptable punishment. Thus, although the state may convict the Tisons of first degree
(1982) (death penalty excessive for one who does not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (death penalty is grossly disproportional for crime of rape
and forbidden by eighth amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67, 382 (1910)
(15 year sentence to include hard labor and chains and loss of certain civil rights unconstitutional
under eighth amendment).
261 Salem, 463 U,S. at 290. The Court there said, "In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that
a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted."
Id.
262 See num, 107 S. Ct. at 1687. justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, said, "A critical
facet of the individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental state
with which the defendant commits the crime." Id.; cf. supra note 104.
peg
	 e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("imposition of death by public authority
is so profoundly different from all other penalties").
2" In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976), the Court called the death penalty "an
extreme sanction suitable to the most extreme of crimes."
265
	
Coker v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 584, 600 (1976).
266 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
267 See supra note 35 for the pertinent text of the statute under which the Tisons were convicted.
2" See supra note 246-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Tison brothers'
participation in the crime.
662 Armed robbery is an "aggravated form of robbery in which the defendant is armed with a
dangerous weapon, though it is not necessary to prove that he used the weapon to effectuate the
robbery." Bukcit's Law DICTIONARY 99 (5th ed. 1979).
2" A state may convict an individual of kidnapping if the person
unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or business, ... with any of
the following purposes: (a) to hold for ransom or hostage; or (b) to facilitate
commission of any felony ... ; or (c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the
victim or another; or (d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or
Political function.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 781-82 (5th ed. 1979) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE, 212.1).
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murder,271
 Enmund mandates that death is a disproportionate punishment for the felony
murders they committed.
In addition to a disproportionality between the Tisons' crimes and their punishment,
the Tisons' mental states did not warrant the criminal culpability the Court attributed to
it. The principle that the more purposeful the offense, the more serious the transgres-
sion, and therefore the more severe the punishment, has a rich legal history."2 Though
not purporting to do so, the Tison majority effectively equated reckless indifference with
intent. The Court reasoned that the potentially shocking nature of a person's reckless
indifference to human life, in certain circumstances, warranted equating the two mental
states. 278 Admittedly•the reckless disregard implicit in purposefully engaging in criminal
activities known to carry a great risk of death constitutes a highly culpable state of
mind,274 An important qualitative difference, however, exists between this state of mind
and intent. The difference lies in the choice each actor has made. As the Tison dissent
recognized, the reckless actor has not chosen to facilitate the killing in the same way as
the intentional actor. 2" Thus, not only do the mental states of the intentional and reckless
actor differ, but so too, using the Tison majority's analysis, does the seriousness of their
crimes and, in theory, their deserved punishments P 76
In capital sentencing cases, the Supreme Court has insisted that the sentencer
consider each individual separately. 2" Thus, the sentencer should focus on each individ-
ual's record and culpability. 278 The sentencer should distinguish between those who
purposefully take life and those who do not." 9 In Enmund, the Court resisted attempts
to treat Enmund like his cofelons who intentionally murdered the victims. 280 In short,
the Enmund Court held that the eighth amendment prohibited such an approach. 281 In
Tison, however, the Court failed to follow Enmund and, at least for the purposes of
imposing punishment, recognized no difference between the intentional killers and those
displaying a reckless indifference to human life. By treating the two situations alike, the
Tison Court dispensed with a societal judgment firmly grounded in criminal law that
2" In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978), the Court said, "that States have authority to
make alders and abettors equally responsible, as a matter of law, with principals, or to enact felony-
murder statutes, is beyond constitutional challenge."
"2 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1687.
"3 id. at 1688.
214 Id.
272 Id. at 1695 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
276 Because the Tisons did not facilitate the deaths of the victims, their activity was less pur-
poseful than the intentional killer's, and therefore, their punishment should be less severe as
compared to the intentional killer.
2" Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (Court "insist[s] on 'individualized considera-
tion as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence") (quoting Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
278 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("[W]e believe that in capital cases
the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires considera-
tion of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.")
(citation omitted).
279 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
280 See id.
281 Id.
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distinguishes the culpability of those who acted with a purpose to end a life from those
who did not. 282
In two respects then, the Tison decision offends the proportionality principle. Death
as a punishment for such criminals as Ricky and Raymond Tison, who in no way
participated in or intended to bring about the killings, is excessive. Moreover, the Tisons'
mental states did not rise to the level of the intentional actor. Thus, their criminal
culpability and punishment should have differed from the intentional actor's. The Tison
Court ignored the long held principle that the intentional and nonintentional killer have
different culpabilities. Therefore, in the case of Ricky and Raymond Tison, death was a
disproportionate punishment.
C. Legislatures, the Death Penalty and Felony Murder
In surveying state statutes imposing the death penalty on defendants who were
major actors in inherently dangerous felonies, the Tison Court asserted that the number
of states authorizing death "powerfully suggests" that society does not reject such pun-
ishment as grossly excessive."' Upon closer examination, though, the number of juris-
dictions forbidding capital punishment in the Tisons' circumstances exceeds the number
of states that do permit the penalty by a ratio of three to two. 284 The Court's conclusion
is therefore questionable at best. The majority ignored the fact that, at the time, thirteen
jurisdictions had no capital sentencing statute at all." , In addition, the Tison Court
acknowledged but disregarded eleven states that do not authorize the death penalty for
a defendant who substantially participates in a felony resulting in murder, but manifests
only an extreme indifference to life. 286 Of the remaining twenty-six 2" states that had
capital punishment statutes at the time of Tison, four required that the defendant either
killed or intended to kil1, 288 and two others rejected capital punishment under the Tison
substantial participation and reckless indifference standard. 289 Finally, the Tison majority
cited California as authorizing the death penalty for felony murder absent an intent to
kill. 299 The California Supreme Court, however, has stated that the state's capital pun-
ishment statutem requires the state to prove intent to kill if the defendant is an aider
and abettor, but not the actual killer. 292
In sum, when the Supreme Court decided Tison in April 1987, thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia did not sanction the imposition of the death penalty on such
282 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 625 (White, J., concurring).
282 See supra note 177 and accompanying text,
284 See infra notes 285-93 and accompanying text,
285 See Tison, 107 S. Ct, at 1697 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
285 Id. at 1686. For a list of those states forbidding imposition of death where a defendant's
actions were substantial and the likelihood of death raises an inference of extreme indifference to
life, sec id. at 1686 n.10.
282 See generally Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1097 & n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
288 Id. For a list of those states that reserve the death penalty for those who actually and
intentionally kill, see id.
282 See id. See supra note 220 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two states rejecting
the imposition of the death penalty in most cases.
2'40 Tim, 107 S. Ct. at 1686 n.8.
221 Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2(a)(17), 190.2(b) (West Supp. 1987).
292 See People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1325, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
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felons as Ricky and Raymond Tison. 295 Significantly, these statistics place the Tison
majority in the minority, 294 and thus undermine the strength of the Court's reasoning.
Moreover, these statistics convey an important message. In the past, the Court has
considered contemporary standards central to the determination of whether certain
punishments violate the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 296 As the Court suggested in Gregg, legislative enactments are one of the
prime indicia of whether society approves of certain punishments. 296 Given that three-
fifths of the states disallow capital punishment where a defendant did not kill or intend
to kill, American society seems to repudiate the death penalty in such circumstances as
the Tisons'. Thus, the Tison majority's contention that the legislation "powerfully suggests
that our society does not reject the death penalty as grossly excessive" 297 in situations
where the nontriggerperson lacked the intent to kill is contrary to the facts.
D. Senlencers, the Death Penalty and Felony Murder
Gregg v. Georgia and its progeny have established that, in addition to the legislature,
the jury also acts as a significant barometer of society's view of the appropriateness of
capital punishment. 295 The Enmund Court focused on the characteristics of those exe-
cuted in the past twenty-five years, one aspect of jury sentencing. The Court found that,
of the 362 persons executed between 1954 and 1982, only 6 were nontriggerpersons,
and all of those executions occurred in 1955. 299 Furthermore, the Enmund Court found
that juries had rejected the death penalty for such crimes as Earl Enmund's, in which
the defendant did not kill or intend to take life.6" If the Tison majority had examined
the cases of persons executed since 1982, the Court would have seen that sentencers are
still reluctant to impose the death penalty where defendants have not killed or intended
to kill. Between 1982 and the Tison ruling, states have executed 65 people."' In all but
two cases, courts found the individual executed to have committed the actual killing. 502
In the two cases where some evidence suggested that the person executed did not actually
kill the victim, the record contained sufficient facts to show the defendant intended the
298 See generally Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1697 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
294 In Tison, Justice Brennan claimed in his dissent that "contrary to the Court's implication
that its view is consonant with that of the majority of American jurisdictions,' ... the Court's view
is itself distinctly the minority position." Id. at 1697 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting majority at
1687).
298
 In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 282, 305 (1976), the Court considered the
constitutionality of North Carolina's mandatory death sentence statute. In declaring the law invalid,
the Court premised its analysis on the integral part that contemporary values play in eighth
amendment applications. Id. at 288 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-82 (1976)).
295 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179.
297 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1686 (emphasis in original).
298 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 439-40 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (jury is reliable index of contemporary attitudes toward the death penalty); Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.I5 (1968) (important jury function in capital sentencing cases is
maintaining link between community values and penal system).
299 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-95 (1982).
202 Id. at 795.
"I Mon, 107 S. Ct. at 1698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"2 1d. at 1698 n.16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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victim's death."' Thus, the conclusion reached in Enmund, that the Court was unaware
of any individual convicted of felony murder, and executed, over the past quarter century
who did not kill or intend the victim's death, still remains valid up to August t987."
The Tison standard, however, runs counter to thirty-two years of sentencers' reluctance
to impose the death penalty in such cases.
A survey of Arizona cases where death row inmates raised Enmund challenges also
illustrates sentencing attitudes toward defendants who have not killed, attempted to kill,
or intended to kill. Interestingly, of the sixty-four persons on death row in Arizona as
of August 1987, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that all who raised and lost an
Enntund challenge either killed or intended to kill."' As Justice Brennan pointed out in
his dissent, the Tisons' sentence appears to be an aberration within Arizona as well as
the United States.'
Perhaps more revealing than the characteristics of those executed from 1955 to the
present, and of the Arizona cases where the death row inmates raised Enmund claims, is
an analysis of those jurisdictions that authorize and impose the death penalty where a
defendant substantially participates in a felony resulting in death and displays a reckless
indifference to human life.'"? The Tison majority cited five cases it considered to repre-
sent. the "apparent consensus" that substantial participation in an inherently violent
felony may justify a capital sentence even absent an intent to kill." Yet the Tisons' case
is clearly distinguishable from these because, in each of the five sample cases, the state
trial or appellate court suggested that the defendants actually participated in or intended
the killing."9
Thus, the available data on capital sentencing does not support the Tison decision.
The vast majority of those executed in the last thirty-two years actually committed the
murders. In cases where the defendant's role in the murder was unclear, the courts have
suggested the defendant either participated in the killing or intended for the victims to
die. In addition, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed all the death sentences appealed
on the basis of Enmund; the court determined that, in each case, the appellant had killed.
or intended to kill. A case study of one state which, prior to Tison, authorized the death
363
 In Green v. Zant, 738 F.2d 1529, 1533-34 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098 (1984), the
petitioner, sentenced to death for murder, claimed the Enmund standard barred capital punishment
in his case because a witness testified that the murder was committed while petitioner was away
getting gasoline. The court of appeals rejected his challenge, noting that petitioner's conviction was
based on a malice murder theory — not felony murder — and the evidence supported the verdict
on the theory. Id. at 1533-34.
In Skillern v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1067 (1984), the
court of appeals found Enmund inapplicable because, although evidence presented showed that
Skillern did not kill the victim, it did indicate that he agreed in advance to rob and kill the victim.
"4 See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796.
"' See supra note 224.
3°6 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1699 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
507
 For those states supporting the majority position, see supra note 176 and accompanying text.
"8 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1686-87 (citing Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 84, 656 S.W.2d 684, 687
(1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 599-600 (Del. 1985), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1589 (1987); Ruffin v. State, 420 So.2d 591, 594 (Fla. 1982); Allen v. State, 253
Ga. 390, 395 n.3. 321 S.E.2d 710, 715 n.3 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985); People v. Davis,
95 III. 2d 1, 52, 447 N.E.2d 353, 378, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983); Selvage v. State, 680 S.W.2d
17, 22 (Tex. Cr. App. 1984)).
309 See supra note 222.
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penalty in.such circumstances as the Tisons', provides a final statistical device that may
confirm the capital sentencing trend in the United States.
Arkansas is one of the four states310
 that authorize the death penalty in felony
murder cases where the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. 3 "
Specifically, if a person causes the death of another while manifesting an extreme
indifference to human life, that person has committed murder for which the punishment
may be death. 312
 Currently, thirty persons sit on death row in Arkansas." Of the twenty-
six on which information is available, Arkansas courts found twenty to have committed
the actual killingm4
 and suggested the remaining six defendants intended to kill the
310 Than, 107 S. Ct. at 1685. The other three states that specifically allow capital punishment
with a state of mind of reckless indifference are Kentucky, Illinois, and Delaware. Id. at 1685 n.5.
The reader should be advised that this is a rudimentary case study and the conclusions that have
been drawn should be so understood.
311
	 at 1685.
312
 Section 41-1501(1)(a) of the Arkansas Annotated Statutes defines capital murder as when a
person during "the course of and in furtherance of the felony (rape, kidnapping, arson, vehicular
piracy, robbery, burglary, or escape in the first degree], or in immediate flight therefrom, he or an
accomplice causes the death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life." (1977 & Supp. 1985). Section 41-1501(3) makes capital murder
punishable by death or life imprisonment without parole.
313 Telephone interview with Jack Cillean, Assistant Attorney General, Arkansas Attorney Gen-
eral's Office (April 13, 1988).
Other organizations besides state governments monitor death row populations. One such group
is the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. See generally NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. As of March I, 1988, the NAACP counted thirty persons
on death row in Arkansas, including two men imprisoned in other states. Telephone interview with
Tanya Coke, Director of Research, Capital Punishment Project, NAACP Legal Defense and Edu-
cational Fund (April 15, 1988). These two men are not considered to be on death row by the
Arkansas Attorney General's office. Telephone interview with Jack Gillean, Assistant Attorney
General, Arkansas Attorney General's Office (April 13, 1988).
31'
	 e.g., Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421, 425, 731 S.W.2d 756, 758 (1987) (defendant entered
house to kill victim); Hill v. State, 289 Ark. 387, 393, 713 S.W.2d 233, 236 (1986) (inference from
evidence that defendant fatally shot state trooper), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1331 (1987); Fretwell v.
State, 289 Ark. 91, 99, 708 S.W.2d 630, 634 (1986) (defendant killed victim); Snell v. State, 287
Ark. 264, 265, 698 S.W.2d 289, 289 (1985) (defendant convicted of killing state trooper); Pruett v.
State, 282 Ark. 304, 311, 669 S.W.2d 186, 190 (1984) (defendant admitted killing victim), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1985); Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 388, 659 S.W.2d 168, 169 (1983)
(defendant shot and killed policeman), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 988 (1984); Simmons v. State, 278 Ark.
305, 309, 319, 645 S.W.2d 680, 682, 688 (defendant committed multiple murders), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 865 (1983); Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 101, 633 S.W.2d 3, 5 (defendant shot and killed
policeman), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1022 (1982); Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 78, 628 S.W.2d 284, 287
(1982) (robbed gas station; kidnapped and shot repeatedly the owner and game and fish officer;
officer died), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982); Hayes v. State, 274 Ark. 440, 446, 625 S.W.2d 498,
501 (1981) (defendant admitted that he murdered girlfriend and cab driver), aff'd, 278 Ark. 211,
216, 645 S.W.2d 662, 666, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); Singleton v. State, 274 Ark. 126, 128-
29, 623 S.W.2d 180, 181 (1981) (robbed and stabbed storekeeper, killing her), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
938 (1982); Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 341, 345, 356, 605 S.W.2d 430, 434, 439 (1980) (defendant
robbed and killed deceased to eliminate as a witness), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981); Swindler
v. State, 264 Ark. 107, 110, 569 S.W.2d 120, 121 (1978) (defendant shot and killed policeman), cent.
denied, 449 U.S. 1057 (1980); Pickens v. State, 261 Ark. 756, 761, 551 S.W.2d 212, 215 (1977)
(defendant robbed store and killed victim to eliminate a witness), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 909 (1978);
Hulsey v. State, 261 Ark. 449, 451-52, 549 S.W.2d 73, 75 (1977) (defendant shot service station
attendant seven times during robbery), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978).
In several other Arkansas cases, the evidence indicated that the defendant actually murdered
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victims." Thus, although the Arkansas statute supports the Mon decision, the death
row population there is composed primarily of those who killed or intended to kill.
There are several possible reasons for this underrepresentation on Arkansas death
row of those who manifested an extreme indifference to human life, but who did not
kill or intend to kill: prosecutors do not ask for the death penalty in such circumstances,
sentencers do not impose capital punishment in such contexts, or the courts simply have
not faced such a set of facts. Whatever the rationale, this brief study suggests that
Arkansas supports Tison in theory only. Although Arkansas's statute allows the state to
execute the felon who possesses an extreme disregard for human life,316 those whom
Arkansas condemns to death are individuals who killed or intended to kill. The presence
of such a statute, therefore, at least in Arkansas as of April, 1988, does not necessarily
represent acceptance by the public or application in the courts. 317
Thus, as an objective index of societal attitudes towards the death penalty, sentencers
have displayed an unwillingness to impose death on those who did not kill or intend to
take life. Characteristics of those who have been executed as well as those who have
appealed their capital sentences in Arizona demonstrate this unwillingness. Even in
Arkansas, which statutorily permits the death penalty where the defendant possessed a
reckless indifference to human life, sentencers choose not to apply the sanction in such
circumstances, Therefore, the evidence simply does not support the Then majority's
conclusion that. an "apparent consensus" supports its holding. 5 ' 8 Reality, as found in the
courts and public sentiment, suggests otherwise.
E. The Consequences of Tison
The problem with the Then opinion extends far beyond the fact that precedent,
legislative enactments, juries and principles of proportionality do not substantiate the
holding. The true danger lies in Tison's consequences on future capital sentencing cases.
The standards announced in Tison may very well encourage the kind of arbitrary and
unpredictable capital sentencing the Court previously has warned against and has de-
clared unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia, declared several state capital sentencing
statutes unconstitutional because the statutes provided for the wanton administration of
the victim. In Ronald Wilson's case, Wilson acted alone in committing a rape-murder. Telephone
interview with Jack Gillean, Assistant Attorney General, Arkansas Attorney General's Office (April
13, 1988). In Jonas Whitinore's case, Wbituatire perpetrated a robbery-murder by himself. Id. In
the case of Michael O'Rourke, the evidence suggested that O'Rourke committed a felony murder
by himself, as the state charged no other individual. Id. The state sentenced Mark Gardner to death
for strangling and killing three persons. Telephone interview with Clint Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, Arkansas Attorney General's Office (April 13, 1988). Finally, in Robert Burnett's case, the
state convicted Burnett of beating a store clerk to death during a robbery. Id.
515 See, e.g., Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 84, 656 S.W.2d 684, 687 (1983), cert. dented, 465 U.S.
1051 (1984) (circumstances of case bring it within Enmund exception); Ruiz v. State, 265 Ark. 875,
897, 582 S.W.2d 915, 926 (1979) (defendants charged with premeditated and deliberate murder),
aff'd, 273 Ark. 94, 106, 617 S.W.2d 6, 13, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1093 (1981).
316 See supra note 312 for the Arkansas capital murder statute.
6r7
	 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1986) (Georgia sodomy statute that did not
mention a sexual preference in its language enforcement history demonstrates "Georgia's apparent
willingness to enforce against homosexuals a law it seems not to have any desire to enforce against
heterosexuals." Id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
913 Then, 107 S. Ct. at 1686 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1006
	
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:969
the death penalty. 319 Several justices in Furman warned that arbitrary capital sentencing
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 320 Justice Brennan, concurring in the opinion,
represented this group, stating that the eighth amendment condemns the arbitrary
administration of severe punishments."'
Subsequent to Furman, the Court continued to express the same genuine concern
about arbitrary capital sentencing. In its invalidation of a mandatory death penalty
statute, the Court held such an automatic sanction incapable of fulfilling Furman's basic
requirement that rational and reviewable standards should replace arbitrary standards
in the infliction of capital punishment. 322 Moreover, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court
acknowledged that states could draft standards so as to ensure that sentencers do not
impose death in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.323
Tison neither encourages this concern for reviewable standards nor illuminates the
distinction between those cases deserving capital punishment and those that do not.
After Tison, the courts will, absent legislative action to the contrary, impose the death
penalty on defendants who substantially participate in a felony in which they acted with
reckless indifference to human life. As for what constitutes "reckless indifference," the
Tison majority itself offers no assistance. 324 The Tison opinion leaves the question open
to the kind of speculation and capriciousness the Court had warned about only a decade
before. Moreover, the vague standard the Tison Court promulgated arguably may be
satisfied by every violent felony. As the Tison Court and Justice Brennan, in his dissent,
pointed out, the possibility of bloodshed inheres in any violent crime 3 25 Similarly, by
participating in an armed robbery, an actor necessarily exhibits a reckless indifference
to human life, regardless of whether he or she desired that any one be injured or killed.
As a result, the Tison standard blurs the line distinguishing when the death penalty
applies from when it does not. This blurring calls for the very arbitrariness that the
eighth amendment prohibits.
F. A Return to Enmund
This casenote has demonstrated that the Tison holding is inconsistent with precedent,
legislative and jury trends, and principles of proportionality. Left alone, Tison fosters the
type of arbitrary decision-making that characterized capital sentencing in Furman — a
type that the Court has constantly opposed. For a holding substantiated by the objective
factors that the Court has looked to in its eighth amendment analysis, and for one that
avoids capricious capital sentencing, the Court should abandon the substantial partici-
pation and reckless indifference standard articulated in Tison and return to the kill or
intend to kill standard that Enmund enunciated.
319 See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
32 G See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
321  Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
322
 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
323 See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976). See also Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (state imposing capital punishment has "constitutional responsibility to
tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
penalty").
324 Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1688 ("lwle will not attempt to precisely delineate the particular types of
conduct and states of mind warranting imposition of the death penalty here").
325 Id. at 1684, 1691 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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If one accepts the basic premise that the death penalty is constitutional, then exe-
cuting one who has in fact killed generates the least controversy in capital sentencing
cases. Legislatures authorize and sentencers impose such a sanction for the defendant
who murders.'" Moreover, such punishment may not be disproportionate for one who
deliberately takes the life of another. 327 The same reasoning that supports sentencing an
actual killer to death also supports a capital sentence for one who intends to kill because
the only significant difference between the actual killer and one who intends to kill is
the result: the murderer succeeds in his or her action, whereas the individual who
attempts or intends to kill, though desiring to succeed, does not. The determination of
whether a defendant intended to kill, though, is a difficult inquiry.
In those circumstances where the factfinder cannot clearly establish that the defen-
dant actually killed or attempted to kill, the factfinder must turn to the question of
whether the defendant intended to kill. The common law definition of intent may guide
this inquiry. Thus, where the factfinder establishes that the defendant desired that his
or her acts cause death or knew that death was substantially certain to occur, intent to
kill is established, and the state may impose capital punishment.'" Although establishing
that the defendant intended to kill is not an easy determination, it will prove to be less
vague and less prone to abuse than the reckless indifference standard. Under a reckless
indifference approach, a mere showing that the defendant participated in a felony,
which may be sufficient in itself to show reckless disregard, does not establish intent.
Therefore, by requiring that the factfinder determine that the defendant intended to
kill before permitting the sentencer to impose death on him or her, the number of
capital sentences will still reflect society's reservations about limiting the punishment to
a small number of extreme cases.
Given the finality of death, capital punishment is a unique sanction. Accordingly,
the Court has imposed many restrictions on its administration. Case law, legislatures,
juries, and the principle of proportionality provide a constant reminder that society
reserves this sanction for a select group of cases. This group has consisted in the past,
and should remain comprised in the future, of persons who take or desire to take
another's life or who know such a result is likely to occur from their actions. Adopting
a less precise standard such as reckless indifference, in all likelihood, will serve to cloud
those distinctions separating capital from non-capital offenses, and ultimately lead to
arbitrary decision-making in the death sentencing process.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Tison v. Arizona held that substantial participation in a felony
combined with a reckless indifference to human life satisfies the Enmund v. Florida
culpability standard as to when a sentencer may impose the death penalty on a nontrig-,
gerperson, yet still comply with the eighth amendment. Timm, in essence, created a new
standard. After considering the tools the Court has utilized in its eighth amendment
analysis, however, the Tison Court clearly decided the case incorrectly. Tison is inconsistent
with precedent and the death penalty's goals, as well as with the trends in the state
"" See generally Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982),
321 Compare id. al 797, where the Court held the death penalty invalid where the defendant did
not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill.
52" non, 107 S. Ct. at 1684 (quoting W. LA FAVE & A. Scorn, supra note 108, § 28, at 196).
1008	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:969
legislatures and courts. Moreover, Tison contradicts the proportionality principle, in that
the punishment Tison sanctions is excessive when compared to the crime the Tisons
committed. Furthermore, the Tison standard is disproportionate because the brothers'
mental states do not comport with their corresponding criminal culpabilities. Finally,
Tison, by offering a reckless indifference standard that is inherently vague, encourages
the arbitrariness in capital sentencing that the Court has previously held unconstitutional.
To comply with precedent, societal attitudes as evidenced by legislative and sentencing
trends, and principles of proportionality, the Court should abandon the Tison decision
and readopt the Enmund standard that the Constitution permits death as a sanction only
for one who kills, attempts to kill, or intends to kill. Then, and only then, can the courts
maintain a rationally reviewable sentencing structure and avoid arbitrary decision-mak-
ing.
DAVID H. GANZ
